University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2014

Microfinance and Poverty Reduction: How Risks Associated With
Government Policies Affect Whether Microfinance Alleviates
Poverty in Latin-America
Brian Warby
University of South Carolina - Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Warby, B.(2014). Microfinance and Poverty Reduction: How Risks Associated With Government Policies
Affect Whether Microfinance Alleviates Poverty in Latin-America. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/2745

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

MICROFINANCE AND POVERTY REDUCTION: HOW RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH GOVERNMENT
POLICIES AFFECT WHETHER MICROFINANCE ALLEVIATES POVERTY IN LATIN-AMERICA
by
Brian Warby
Bachelor of Arts
Brigham Young University, 2007

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Carolina
2014
Accepted by:
Lee Walker, Major Professor
Jerel Rosati, Committee Member
Xuhon Su, Committee Member
Gerald McDermott, Committee Member
Lacy Ford, Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies

© Copyright by Brian Warby, 2014
All Rights Reserved.

ii

Dedication
I dedicate this work to my wife, Candice, for her unwavering love, patience and
support throughout this process. Her encouragement helped sustain my motivation to
press forward when the project seemed too daunting. I couldn’t have done it without her.

iii

Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge several people who helped make this project what it
is. First I would like to thank Lee Walker, my dissertation advisor, for reading the drafts,
making constructive suggestions that helped improve the final product, and his support
throughout the process. I also wish to thank Jerel Rosati for his feedback during the
process, and blunt rebukes when I needed them; Gerald McDermott for his personal
attention and setting me up with professional contacts who facilitated the project; and Su,
Xuhong for being willing to join the committee just days before the defense.

iv

Abstract
The expansion of financial services to the poor, now widely referred to as
microfinance, quickly saw tremendous success in Bangladesh beginning in the 1970's and
was exported to a number of other countries. For a time microfinance was spoken of as a
panacea, in part because it is more detached from governments than other forms of
poverty alleviation. I develop a model based on expected utility theory that looks at how
risks associated with government policies and characteristics affect whether this
mechanism eases poverty. Using a large N analysis of Latin-American states from 19902010 and a case study analysis to examine the economic and political development of
Brazil, I find that risk of political and economic instability helps explain the effects of
microfinance on poverty alleviation. However, rather than stability in the political and
economic system making microfinance more efficient for poverty reduction, it appears
that microfinance has the greatest poverty reduction effect under conditions of instability.
This may be because the type of people who borrow from microfinance institutions
during higher risk times are using loans as an informal insurance mechanism, or because
higher risk functions as a selection mechanism either selecting for the most lucrative uses
of microfinance or selecting for people who are near or above the poverty line and not
those who are well below.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Microfinance is a topic about which there are many debates regarding its
effectiveness, purpose, and ideal and legitimate forms. While there are many important
questions that yet remain unanswered, one of the key questions is whether microfinance
actually helps the people it is said to help - those who live below or near poverty levels.
The debate is illustrated by the following two stories.
The first story was originally told by Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen
Bank and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on poverty alleviation.
Murshida was born to a poor family and married an unskilled factory worker
when she was 15 years old. Her husband had a gambling problem and was
physically abusive. His gambling got so bad that he sold the roof off of their
humble house to pay his debts. When Murshida confronted him about his
neglecting her and their three children he went into a rage, beat her and
divorced her on the spot. Murshida took her children to her brother’s house
where she found some work spinning. When the Grameen Bank came to her
village she persistently sought out a small loan.
“At first Murshida borrowed 1,000 taka [about $30] to purchase a goat and she
paid off the loan in six months with the profits from selling the milk. She was left
with a goat, a kid, and no debt. Encouraged, she borrowed 2,000 taka, bought
raw cotton and a spinning wheel, and began manufacturing lady’s scarves”,
which she sells for 50-100 taka each. She also employs up to twenty-five other
women from her village during peak season. She also used a Grameen Bank
housing loan to build a house on an acre of farmland and set up her brothers in
business trading saris and raw cotton (Roodman 2012).1

This story and the next are both paraphrased from David Roodman’s (2012) book Due
Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance.
1

1

The next story was documented in a film by Tom Heinemann called The Micro
Debt:
Razia, a woman living in a small village in the northern part of Bangladesh had
a relatively comfortable life style, with her own house, cows, and jewelry. She
took a loan from Grameen Bank to pay for her daughter’s education, but found
herself unable to repay the loan.
“I had no money to pay the installments. So I decided to sell the house. These
[microfinance] organizations never stop. They really pressed me. They come
and stay until they get their money. They press us to sell our belongings. So I
sold the house to pay the debt.” After selling the house her family built, she
lamented “…I have nothing left to sell, except the kitchen pots” (Roodman
2012).
In reading these two very different stories about how microfinance affected
peoples’ lives, one cannot help but question why the two outcomes were so dramatically
different. Of course, these are complex processes and there are a variety of contributing
factors. Many scholars have studied microfinance in order to better understand what
those factors are and how the processes work. The two stories above show that
microfinance can be a powerful tool, either for good, helping to improve the quality of
life of customers, or for harm, stripping from the near poor their thin cushion against
poverty and leaving them entirely destitute. If microfinance generally follows the pattern
displayed in the first story, wide and extensive implementation should help improve the
quality of life for the poor all over the world. On the other hand, if it tends to follow the
pattern in the second story, global implementation could be disastrous.
Why Study Microfinance?
In 2000, the United Nations (UN) held the Millennium Summit, which adopted
the UN Millennium Declaration. The declaration represents a commitment to improve the
quality of life of people in the developing world. The declaration and subsequent
negotiations and summits outlined a number of specific goals, one of which was to
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reduce poverty by half by 2015. In 2010, states met again to work on the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and pledged more than $40 billion in resources to help
achieve the desired outcomes. Unfortunately, in 2012 it does not look like the world is
very likely to achieve the MDGs by 2015, but that has not deterred development efforts.
The global community continues to strive to eliminate poverty and hunger. One of the
greatest obstacles in this struggle, however, is the lack of consensus on how to reduce
poverty and help the poorest countries develop.
A survey of popular titles by economists over the last decade tells the story. From
Paul Collier's The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can
Be Done About It (2007), to Jeffrey Sachs' The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities
for Our Time (2005), or William Easterly's titles The Elusive Quest for Growth:
Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (2001) and The White Man's
Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little
Good (2006). There are a number of posited solutions, of course, which tend to drive the
debate on. Some scholars, like Sachs, argue that digging wells, building dams, and
highways, donating computers to schools and all of the other projects typically associated
with development are necessary to help the developing countries make their way on to
the global playing field as viable competitors. On the other side are economists like
William Easterly who does not hold such a rosy view of the world. He ridicules
traditional development aid as “utopian blueprints” that sound revolutionary but which
never fully accomplish what they set out to do (Easterly 2006, 367). He argues instead
that development must proceed in a more natural, even biological process, that can be fed
a healthy diet of laissez faire policies and political stability, but which follows a unique
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path to maturity because no two countries face the same constraints on the political
system, society or economy. Finally, foreign aid is hailed in some circles as the way
forward, as proposed in Aid that Works: Successful Development in Fragile States
(Manor 2007), but in other circles it is questioned or even dismissed as ineffective or as
The Aid Trap (Hubbard and Duggan 2009).
Clearly, the economic development literature is far from achieving consensus on
how to help poor countries grow, or how to help poor people in those countries achieve
higher standards of living. While a great deal of research has examined the intricacies of
foreign aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), loan forgiveness, and membership in
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), much less research has
examined microfinance and its effectiveness. This may be in part because microfinance,
at the scale we see today, is a relatively new phenomenon (Roodman 2012). Although it
has not received as much attention as other approaches to economic growth and poverty
alleviation, it is, in many ways, a unique approach.
Microfinance is especially interesting because it is an economic development
technique that relies far less on the state than most others. Foreign aid, for example, is
often given from the government of one state to the government of another state
(Hubbard and Duggan 2009). Alternatively, it might be given directly to villages or spent
directly on development projects. Still, it is generally only distributed with the recipient
government’s permission and it might merely substitute for government spending in that
area, thus allowing the government to spend its funds elsewhere. Similarly, FDI is highly
subject to the whims and policies of the recipient state. A recipient state might decide to
appropriate investments within its borders. It might also seek bribes or engage in other
4

rent seeking behavior from the investors (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011). It might
also simply impose high taxes in one form or another on FDI (Busse and Heffeker 2007;
Daude and Stein 2007; Kolstad and Villanger 2008).
The relationship between microfinance and the state, however, is far more
tenuous. The government might be able to affect the microfinance industry through
regulations, but that is often the extent of its control over this market. Much of the
activity in microfinance occurs at the individual level. Individuals are engaging in
financial relationships with companies or organizations and could potentially never
interact directly with the government in any form. In fact, microfinance is really a
formalized, and generally more benevolent, form of an activity that takes place under the
state’s radar in almost every society; money lending. This makes microfinance a unique
and interesting approach to poverty alleviation that may or may not coincide with the
patterns seen with aid, FDI, and other types of programs.
An Introduction to Microfinance
To help the reader understand some of the nuances of microfinance and its
evolution, this section will describe in broad-brush strokes the major actors, processes
and organizations generally involved. Beginning in 1974 Muhammad Yunus and the
Grameen Bank started fighting poverty in Bangladesh differently from the typical
approach of the time, by offering financial services to households deemed unworthy of
credit by commercial institutions or those who could not afford to pay commercial fees.
The expansion of financial services to the poor, now widely referred to as microfinance,
quickly saw tremendous success in Bangladesh and was rapidly exported to a number of
other countries. Logic suggests that if the poor can obtain lump sums of money in order
5

to take advantage of opportunities when they arise, their quality of life will improve. For
a time microfinance seemed to be a panacea, and a group of literature popped up singing
praises to its ability to fight poverty, with titles like Fighting Poverty with Microcredit
(Khandker 1998), Microfinance and Poverty Alleviation (Remenyi and Quinones 2000)
and The Poor Always Pay Back (Dowla and Barua 2006). The microfinance movement
received great distinction in 2006 when Yunus was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his
work that started with the Grameen Bank. Over the last few years, however, scholars
have begun to question both the exportability and the depth of the success reported in the
microfinance literature (Brau and Woller 2004; Ault and Spicer 2009; Roodman 2012).
The problem microfinance faces is that the poor generally have no collateral for
loans, cannot afford the fees required for most formal financial services, and often carry
out a lot of their economic activity in the grey market, so there is no record of income or
credit. Nevertheless, buying houses, paying for education, or building a microenterprise
requires an accumulation of capital that a poor household might not be able to achieve on
its own, even when the payoff for doing so might be significant (Armendariz de Aghion
and Morduch 2005). Formal financial institutions often have little or no information
about the risks associated with lending to individuals in these conditions because, for
example, there are no credit history agencies. Even if the lender knew something about
the borrower’s credit worthiness, the loan sizes would be so small as to be unprofitable.
Yunus and the Grameen Bank, and many other microfinance institutions, tried to work
around these problems to make financial services for the poor at least sustainable so that
they do not have to rely on continual infusions of capital, and perhaps even profitable.
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One approach often relied on by microfinance lenders is to lend to groups. The
loan agent goes to a village and offers a small loan to a group of perhaps 5-15 individuals
with a promise that if it is repaid on time, another, larger, loan will be dispersed to the
group, followed by another and another according to the group’s needs. The benefit of
this approach is that the villagers have much better information about who can be trusted,
and can effectively apply social pressure to ensure that loans are repaid (Armendariz de
Aghion and Morduch 2005). Indeed, some microfinance institutions see repayment rates
exceeding 98%, which is higher than many traditional financial institutions in wealthy
countries (Dowla and Barua 2006).
Another approach is to wait to offer loans to customers while requiring them to
make minimum deposits into a savings account for some period of time to show that they
are reliable and capable of making payments. When the lender holds the money until the
borrower repays the loan, at which time the savings is made available to the borrower.
This doubles the effect of the loan since the customer gets the loan money and the
savings in lump sums, while also giving the lender a degree of collateral against default.
In a similar vein, MFIs generally require regular repayments, which might begin as little
as one week after the loan is disbursed. This is said to help the borrower to be financially
disciplined, since the customer has to save a small amount of money every week or every
month to pay installments (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005). Presumably this
is easier for the borrower than saving the money on their own and paying it all back in a
lump sum when the loan comes due. MFIs mix and match the various mechanisms to
serve their needs and their customers’ needs.
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Early successes reported by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and by BancoSol
in Bolivia led to something of a microfinance revolution. Today there are microfinance
institutions across the world. They take various shapes. Some look and function similarly
to the early Grameen Bank, while others, including the Grameen Bank itself, have
undergone significant innovations, adapting and adopting the various mechanisms to
achieve their objectives most efficiently. While some microfinance institutions remain
non-profit organizations, many for-profit MFIs have entered the market too. This is one
of the more important distinctions among MFIs. Either not-for-profits keep interest rates
and fees just high enough to cover costs, or they dump all of their revenue back into loans
in order to extend outreach or cover loan loss. Both NGOs and governments might run
these. For-profit MFIs tend to have higher interest rates and fees, which put more of a
burden on the customers who are already at or near poverty levels, but it also fills a niche
in the market, since investors can put money into MFIs that will return a profit. This
allows them to expand more quickly and opens doors for commercial sources of funding
that might not be available to non-profit MFIs. There are pros and cons to each of these,
and they often exist simultaneously in any given state or region, depending on
government regulations and the market.
With all of these innovations, microfinance has gained recognition in the
development community. TheMIX.org, a non-profit organization that collects data on
microfinance institutions for policy makers and researchers to use, reports data for over
2000 microfinance institutions in 67 countries, each of which self-identifies as a
microfinance institution of some sort and self-reports data to theMIX. It estimated that
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the total global gross loan portfolio for microfinance was over $65 billion dollars in 2009
(theMIX.org).
Microfinance has caught on among the public in wealthy countries too. Kiva.org,
for example, makes it possible for anybody to lend money through a microfinance
project. The organization collects stories about their borrowers, or entrepreneurs as they
are called by the organization, so that lenders can see who the money is going to. This
approach has been quite successful. Kiva has attracted over a million lenders who have
jointly lent out nearly $500 million in zero interest loans since the organization was
founded in 2005.
In spite of all of the innovations and adaptations in microfinance over the years, or
perhaps because of them, not all ventures are successful. Depending on the definition of
success, there are numerous examples to illustrate this. The stories presented above
illustrate one failure to improve the quality of life of a customer. Some studies suggest
that Razia’s story is not uncommon, or at least that Murshida’s story is not necessarily the
norm. Microfinance may fail at the institutional level, or at the state level as happened in
Thailand or Andrha Pradesh province in India (Mahajan 2007; Islam 2009; Imai, Arun
and Annim 2010; Roodman 2012). This project will advance our understanding of
microfinance and how it can be used successfully.
Research Question
The empirical puzzle that is driving this project stems from the observation that
while microfinance appears to be quite successful in some cases, such as in most of
Bangladesh, it appears to have failed miserably in others, such as northern Thailand,
which despite having considerable access to financial services available for the poor has
9

seen no improvement in poverty rates or quality of life among the poor (Imai, Arun and
Annim 2010). I suspect that the government plays a significant role by implementing
policies and agreements that shape the regulations and the market for microfinance. The
primary research question, then, is 'how does the government affect the ability of MFIs to
reduce poverty?' This question can be divided into two distinct questions, but it also
spawns a number of corollary questions. First, the question might be reworded as 'does
better governance create economic conditions that make microfinance a more efficient
mechanism for reducing poverty?' This question addresses where, or under what types of
political conditions a dollar of microfinance capital has the greatest impact on poverty
reduction. This might be a question that a philanthropist asks herself when considering a
donation to an MFI somewhere in the world if she wants her donation to have the largest
impact possible on global poverty. Alternatively, an entrepreneur or financial firm
considering opening a commercial MFI might be equally interested in the answer to this
question.
While some people focus on poverty reduction at the global level, others are
interested in poverty reduction in a particular country. They might want to know how to
reduce poverty in a specific geographic area or state. For this group the original question
might be reworded as 'what policies can a government introduce to make microfinance
more effective at reducing poverty within its borders.' In other words, the results of this
study will have real world implications for philanthropists, investors, MFI managers,
entrepreneurs and policy makers. Although microfinance has been found to be a useful
tool for combating poverty in some cases, we need to understand it more thoroughly in
order to use it effectively. We have learned much since Yunus began making micro-loans
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in 1974, but there are still aspects about which we have little empirically substantiated
understanding.
Many scholars have studied various aspects of microfinance, and several have
even examined how government policies and bureaucracy might affect microfinance. The
difference between those works and this one is that they have looked at things like
whether the MFIs were able to grow (Ault and Spicer 2009), or how efficiently the MFIs
functioned in terms of repayment rates or other measures of the financial health of
institutions (Duflos and Imboden 2003; Meagher et al 2006). This project will focus
specifically on how government policies and bureaucracy affect whether or not
microfinance actually improves the lives of the poor.2
This project has merit beyond the policy and business worlds too. Although the
development and growth literature has studied microfinance from a number of angles,
that which addresses how government regulations and bureaucracy affect the individual
level impact of microfinance is still sparse (see Hagard and Tiede 2011 for an exception).
This project will add to the theoretical literature as it synthesizes across several disparate
literatures to answer the questions raised above. It will bring together research from the
governance and rule of law literature in political science, the growth and development
literature, and the foreign direct investment (FDI) literatures from economics. It will also

Many political scientists would simply call this “governance”. However, in the
microfinance literature “governance” refers to the management of MFIs, not to the
management of the state. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion I depart from the
political science norm and use the more cumbersome terms “bureaucracy” and
“institutions”.
2
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add to the body of empirical work on microfinance that is still trying to understand its
impact more precisely.
The major theoretical contribution I expect to make is to look at microfinance
through the lens of a political scientist interested in governance. This will give me
leverage over a problem that has some important real world implications for billions of
people living below or near the poverty line around the world and who might benefit
from microfinancial services. Understanding what makes microfinance work and what
does not makes it a more precise tool in the hands of policy makers and investors. The
more information policy makers have about microfinance, the better they can tailor
policies that will encourage the efficient allocation of resources.
There are several possible outcomes from this project. One is that the state affects
the poverty alleviation capabilities of microfinance, either positively or negatively. As
indicated above, this would be an important finding because it might suggest where
microfinance investments could be used most effectively for poverty alleviation and
where other approaches might be efficacious. This is likely a complex set of
relationships, though. This project would be the first deep plunge into understanding the
intricacies of the conditions under which the relationships exist. It would almost certainly
open up a fruitful avenue for future research. It might also help policy makers and NGOs,
IGOs or partner states help shape policies and bureaucracy in a poor state to maximize
poverty alleviation from microfinance.
Another potential outcome is that the state has no effect on microfinance. This
would be a surprising result since virtually all other efforts at poverty alleviation are, at
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least somewhat, influenced by the state.3 A finding that the state has no effect on poverty
alleviation through microfinance would present a shocking anomaly in economic
development and international political economy literatures.
Structure of the Dissertation
The next chapter discusses several groups of literature that are related to the
research question presented above. The first group of literature discusses previous
research on microfinance, with an emphasis on impact studies. Many experts have
examined the effect that microfinance has on the poor. Much of the literature has found
that it is helpful, although some has found either no discernible effect or even a negative
effect on the poor. This dichotomy is one of the primary motivations for this project.
Other literatures discussed include risk and how it is used to understand decision making,
the effect of political and economic instability on other poverty alleviation and
development mechanisms, and Popkin’s rational peasant argument, or the ability of the
poor to make strategic decisions about their personal financial situations (Popkin 1980).
Chapter three presents a theory of the effects government and stability might have
on the poverty reduction effect of microfinance. It first argues that microfinance should
have at worst a neutral effect on poverty since the poor are not required to take loans and
are only likely to do so if it improves their quality of life in some way. It then discusses
how political institutions and political or economic instability might affect whether a
microfinance borrower is actually able to improve her quality of life by taking advantage

3

The popular titles by well-known economists mentioned earlier all give some attention
to the functioning of the state, as do many other academic and policy oriented research
papers.
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of microfinance services. It sets out three hypotheses to be tested in the subsequent
chapters.
Chapter four is the first empirical test of the theory. It examines a panel of all
Latin American states for which there is data over a 20 year time period. It employs
linear regression to determine whether there is support for the hypotheses developed in
chapter three. The results support the connection between microfinance and poverty
reduction. Political institutions and even political stability do not seem to change the
relationship between microfinance and poverty alleviation, but economic and financial
instability do, though not in the way the theory from chapter three expects.
Since political institutions did not seem to have any effect on the relationship
between microfinance and poverty alleviation, the next empirical chapter focuses on the
effects of instability. Chapter five is a case study which looks at the political
developments in Brazil from about 1930 to the present. It discusses the economic
environment in Brazil when microfinance began to take hold on a large scale and how
changes in the political and economic conditions appear to influence the relationship
between microfinance and poverty reduction. This chapter also finds that the economic
environment seems to be important, but less so for the political environment.
The final chapter summarizes the findings of this project. It then discusses the
theoretical contributions of this project. These contributions include further evidence on
the impact of microfinance, but, more importantly, it illustrates one reason that there may
be discrepancies in between others’ findings. It also lends support to the rational peasant
argument and those who suggest that development is best served when the poor are given
the power to make choices. This chapter also points out the implications these findings
14

might have for microfinance practitioners. The most obvious is that microfinance
probably works better in some conditions than in others. It also suggests that
microfinance providers might do well to expand risk reduction services, or insurance, and
not just lending. The chapter concludes by discussing where future research might further
our understanding of these phenomena.
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CHAPTER 2
Previous Research

The research question relates to several other areas of research. While this project
is unique in its focus and approach, the main themes to be addressed here have been
studied by many scholars and experts before, and this project is a piece of a much larger
puzzle. One of the primary themes is, of course, microfinance. Though microfinance is a
relatively new phenomenon – it has only really been a global phenomenon since the 90’s
– it has garnered a lot of attention and has been examined from three general
perspectives. These include the repayment of microloans, the potential for profitable
microfinance and the effect microfinance has on poverty. Each of these will be discussed
in turn. Another key theme is risk. Economists, psychologists and other experts have been
studying risk and how it affects decision makers for a long time. There are different ways
of thinking about risk but the approach adopted here has been employed and analyzed
since von Neumann and Morgenstern first wrote about expected utility theory in the mid1940s (Copleand 1945). A third topic deals with other poverty alleviation and
development mechanisms, and, more precisely, how they are affected by stability. The
final topic has its roots in Samuel Popkin’s Rational Peasants Theory and deals with the
economic decisions of the poor (Popkin 1980).
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Microfinance
Before Yunus created the Grameen Bank, commercial lending institutions did not
lend to the poor for two reasons. First, it was unprofitable. The poor did not need or want
large loans. By the time the bank paid a loan officer to process the loan application for
the small loan a poor borrower might be interested in, the cost of processing the loan was
more than the profit from interest on the loan was worth (de Aghion and Morduch 2005).
Banks would lose money by making micro loans to the poor, even assuming away all
default.
The second reason banks did not loan to the poor was because there was no
guarantee that the impoverish borrower would repay the loan. Often, there are no credit
rating agencies in developing countries, or if there is a credit rating agency, coverage is
far from universal. Either way, banks likely have no reliable way of knowing what sort of
credit history a potential borrower from a poor household might have. Moreover, without
a credit rating that would suffer if the borrower defaulted on the loan, the bank assumed,
perhaps wisely, that the borrower would have no incentive to repay the loan.
It is possible to overcome this lack of information if the borrower has collateral
she can offer against the loan. In that case, the borrower is essentially paying a fee to turn
a non-liquid asset temporarily into a liquid asset. This is virtually impossible for the poor
in most developing countries because they, of course, have very few possessions. Those
few possessions they do have that might be valuable enough to be acceptable as
collateral, such as a house, the poor household likely has no proof of legal ownership, or,
perhaps, any legal rights (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010). Therefore, the poor
effectively have no credit history to show that they are reliable borrowers or which can be
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damaged if they default. Nor do they have any collateral a bank could hold against a loan
in the event of default. Clearly, then, banks have no incentive to offer credit to the poor.
They cannot make any money on it, and they have no reason to believe that the borrower
would not default.
Microfinance institutions have come up with clever ways to deal with these
problems, as described previously. Some of these methods include group lending to
people from the same village or neighborhood who know each other’s financial
situations, forced savings that are relinquished upon repayment, and graduated loan
schemes to encourage repayment. One of the early questions, though, was whether these
approaches to lending worked. Consequently, much of the microfinance literature is
devoted to addressing this question by looking at repayment rates or return borrower rates
to try and understand the conditions under which borrowers were likely to repay loans
(Collins et al 2009; Dowla and Barua 2006; Field and Pande 2007; Hermes and Lensink
2007; Hulme and Arun 2011; Marconi and Mosley 2006; Remenyi 2000; Shoji 2010).
The consensus is that, given a properly administered MFI, microfinance borrowers
consistently repay their loans, and often at higher rates than in the general consumer
credit market.
Another big question in the microfinance literature is whether microfinance could
become first sustainable, and then profitable. Many of the first MFIs, such as the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh or Banco do Nordeste in Brazil were started either by
government actors or other non-profit entities (Duflos and Imboden 2003; Mukherjee
1997). This, in and of itself, is not necessarily a problem. The problem comes from being
able to scale up. If the only actors who have incentives, or are permitted to open and
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operate MFIs are non-profit actors, that severely limits the number of entities that might
be willing to engage in micro-lending. Also, if it falls to governments to create and
operate MFIs, those countries most in need of poverty relief would be the ones least
likely to get it, since the states with the worst poverty problems generally have
governments that are either incapable or uninterested in addressing poverty. This would
then leave it up to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Grameen
Foundation, or inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the Inter-American
Development Bank to create and operate all of the MFIs. The number of these
organizations is somewhat limited and their resources are generally quite limited since
they both rely on donations. So expanding the number and scope of MFIs to be able to
offer financial services to the poor all over the world would be out of the question due to
the dearth of operators and funds.
Also, although group lending makes up some of the difference between loan
processing costs and interest earned on micro-loans by processing several loans for little
more effort than processing a single loan, group lending has its limits. It quickly became
apparent that trying to lend to too large of a group caused more problems than it solved
(de Aghion and Morduch 2005; Roodman 2012). So, this problem left two avenues open.
MFIs could charge enough interest and fees on their loans to cover their lending and
operating costs or they could remain dependent on donations and contributions from third
parties. The latter option would mean that scaling up microfinance would be very
difficult, since it would depend, once again, on donations (Greely 2007).
The other option, to charge higher interest and fees has its own problems. While
this approach would make MFIs independent of continued donations, thereby allowing
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them to expand without the need for increased donations, the annualized interest rates
might have to be as high as 80% APR, or more, to cover costs (Roodman 2012). It is
important to remember that most of these loans are short term loans, often with loan
periods of just a few months. This means borrowers are not actually repaying the loans
1.8 times, but having to pay that kind of interest would severely cut in to any economic
advancement a borrower might make. In other words, a lot of people have argued that
for-profit microfinance is usury and is just another way the rich are trying to get richer off
of the backs of the poor (Schicks 2007). While this is, perhaps, not an unfair critique,
making microfinance profitable is the best way to create a microfinance industry that has
a chance of growing to meet global demand and thereby reach out to the millions of poor
who do not currently have access to financial services.
The question many researchers asked, though, is whether charging those sorts of
interest rates, considered usurious in commercial banking, would deter the poor from
borrowing (Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch 2011; Imai and Annim 2010; Mahajan 2007).
The answer is clearly that it does not. For-profit MFIs have plenty of customers. On the
other hand, they also might not be reaching out to the poorest of the poor because the
MFI is looking for larger returns (Imai, Arun and Annim 2010).
As microfinance became more popular in development circles, Yunus and other
microfinance advocates and practitioners offered convincing anecdotes of people
dramatically improving their quality of life by having access to financial services. An
example is the story of Murshida told at the beginning of Chapter 1. Some people seemed
to take it for granted that microfinance reduced poverty. Of course, stories of
disappointment, like Razia’s, eventually surfaced too so researchers began questioning
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whether microfinance is actually beneficial. On the one hand, there are a number of case
studies which show that microfinance can be very beneficial (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine 2007; Dupas and Robinson 2010; Gulyani and Talukdar 2010; Hulme 2000; Imai
2010; Imai, Arun and Annim 2010; Imai et al 2012; Islam 2009;Khandker 1998;
Montgomery and Weiss 2011; Odell 2011; Remenyi and Quinones 2000). On the other
hand, there are also a number of studies that do not find convincing evidence that
microfinance is beneficial (Karlan and Zinman 2009; Navajas et al 2000). Others find
that it might be helpful, but only under specific and limited conditions (Duvendak et al
2011; Hulme and Arun 2011; Mahajan 2007; Roodman 2012).
Risk
Another of the key themes is risk. Probability theory is the foundation of risk
assessment (Chavas 2004). Studying risk is really a study of decision making behavior.
One of the oldest formal models of decision making that involves risk was first developed
by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1945 (Copeland 1945; Gollier 2001). Von
Neumann and Morgenstern created the expected utility model which simply creates a
view of the world in which actors must make decisions about events that occur with some
degree of probability. Assuming that people are interested in maximizing their utility,
they will make choices that will maximize their probable utility. That is, since nothing is
certain, a person cannot know with perfect confidence whether a particular course of
action will yield the utility she might hope. So choosing an option that has the potential to
yield a great deal of utility, but which is not very likely might not be as beneficial as an
option that has the potential to yield slightly less utility, but with a much greater.
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Expected utility theory, then, is little more than assuming that decision makers are utility
maximizers who understand probability theory, at least at an instinctual level.
While expected utility theory can be quite useful, and has often been employed by
scholars throughout the years, others have raised questions about its validity. One of the
most prominent modifications to expected utility theory was developed by Khanneman
and Tversky (1979). Khanneman and Tversky discovered, through a whole series of
laboratory experiments, that people do not seem to strictly follow expected utility theory
(Tversky and Khanemann 1991). Rather, people seem to be risk neutral, or perhaps even
risk acceptant at relatively low values, but become risk averse at high values. They also
demonstrated that most people value things differently depending on how they conceive
of them in relation to themselves. For example, people tend to place higher value on
things they think of as already owning and which might be lost, than they do on things
that they think of as something that might be gained (Tversky and Khanneman 1981;
1992).
Despite the abundant evidence that expected utility theory is not precisely
accurate, many researchers continue to use it because it is an elegant approach to thinking
about decision making involving risk and the added precision of later modifications, such
as Khanneman and Tversky’s, considerably complicates the model without adding
concomitant value to the prediction value of the model (Binswanger 1980; Cox and
Harrison 2008; Cukierman 1980). It is enough to keep in mind that decision makers are
generally risk averse, especially when they are dealing with what they think of as a lot of
money or value.
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Political and Economic Stability
The third major theme discussed in this work is the effect of governance and
political or economic stability on poverty alleviation and development efforts. This is the
source of risk which might affect potential microfinance customers’ decisions. Few
researchers have written about the effects of poor governance on microfinance, but there
is a strong body of research dealing with how instability affects economic growth, foreign
aid, and foreign direct investment. There is a mountain of evidence that instability
inhibits economic growth and interferes with the effectiveness of poverty alleviation
efforts (Chauvet and Guillamont 2003; Chong, Gradstein and Calderon 2009).
Political stability might affect foreign aid effectiveness because the recipient
government diverts resources away from programs that would promote development or
economic growth in order to shore up the state and maintain the integrity of the
government. In other cases, when states face social instability they address it by
expanding government to create a vast bureaucracy that allows many actors to skim off
the top. Allowing more actors to engage in rent seeking behavior may placate enough
people to forestall more serious instability. The problem for aid is that with so many
actors skimming off the top, those individuals have little incentive to innovate and grow
the economy since they can just engage in rent seeking, and the rest of society has little
ability to do so because all of the skimming leaves little profits for the producer (Hubbard
and Duggan 2009). It might also simply be that those states which tend to be susceptible
to instability also often suffer from corruption, which eats away at peoples’ incentives to
innovate and try to improve their economic situation because they receive a relatively
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small portion of their economic output (Collier 2007; Easterly 2001; Easterly 2006; Hunt
and Laszlo 2012).
While foreign aid is probably the development mechanism that most people are
familiar with, the potential economic growth and poverty reduction effects of FDI are
more relevant to the research question than is foreign aid. Foreign direct investors are
profit driven actors who carefully study the political and economic climate of a country in
which they have or are considering and investment in order to manage their risk. In some
industries there is a significant efficiency advantage to have a portion of a production
process in another country (Balaam and Dillman 2009). This might be because wages or
taxes are lower there, because it is closer to the production inputs, or for a number of
other reasons. There is always a possibility that those advantages could be erased by
unfavorable economic or political conditions. For example, if exchange rates swing
wildly between the investor’s home state and the target state, a rather profitable FDI
prospect could quickly turn into an unprofitable investment. The risk of something like
government appropriation of an industry, a conflict that shuts down production, or an
inadequate response to a natural disaster could all have a major impact on the profitability
of FDI. Consequently, numerous studies have found that FDI is sensitive to stability
(Busse and Hefeker 2007; Daude and Stein 2007; Dutta and Roy 2010; Kolstad and
Villanger 2008). Other studies find that FDI is sensitive to the quality of institutions in
the target state (Globerman and Shapiro 2002; Li and Resnick 2003).
An extreme example of this phenomenon is when a state expropriates the holdings
of a foreign firm. In some historical cases states have simply taken control of entire
industries, often with little or no compensation for foreign investors’ losses. During the
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first half of the twentieth century, the U.S. was heavily involved with the Cuban
economy. U.S. firms invested in Cuba and many Americans travelled to and owned
property in Cuba. When Castro’s government expropriated foreign held firms and
properties after the Cuban Revolution ended in 1959, the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission created by the U.S. Congress certified that U.S. firms and American citizens
lost a total of nearly $7.5 billion worth of assets (Travieso-Diaz 1995).1
While the likelihood of a government expropriating foreign firms is relatively
low, it has happened and could happen again. More importantly, it illustrates the risk for
foreign investors. A more realistic example is civil war. In Collier’s discussion of the
poverty traps that inhibit economic development, the traps he discusses include the war
trap, the natural resource trap, land-locked with bad neighbors and bad governance in a
small state (Collier 2007). Some research suggests that civil war might reduce economic
growth by about 2.3% per year (Collier 2007; Haggard and Tiede 2011). That means at
the end of a seven year war, the economy will be 15% small that it would have been with
no war. For states with otherwise strong economies, this makes for rather modest growth.
These states more likely have relatively weak economies already, so civil war may well
put the economy into recession. Wars cause massive damage and destruction of physical
capital, human capital, the natural environment and the social environment, not to
mention the opportunity cost of fighting rather than producing (Harris 1999). Collier
provides a startling perspective on ubiquity of wars in the poorest of the poor states.
Dividing history up into five year segments, a poor state, or what Collier calls a “Bottom

1

The figure is converted 2013 constant dollars to account for inflation, but does not
include interest on those assets.
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Billion” state, has a one in six chance of experience war in any given five year period
(Collier 2007).
The natural resource trap is when a state relies on natural resource extraction as an
easy source of revenue. It requires little investment in human capital or infrastructure,
and has the potential to pay big dividends. It also tends to subject the economy to great
instability because the national economy relies so heavily on just a few outputs and
natural resource markets tend to see wild swings in prices (Balaam and Dillman 2011). It
is good to be a major exporter of a natural resource when commodity prices are high, but
when prices slump it can be very damaging.
Institutions affect economic growth too. For example, Rodrik and Wacziarg find
that democracy promotes economic growth because it reduces uncertainty by taking the
jumpiness out of the growth curve (Rodrik and Wacziarg 2004). It is not uncommon to
see poorly governed states experience spurts of economic growth. An example is the
Brazilian growth miracle from 1967-1973 during which time Brazil was under military
rule. The economy grew at double digits for six years before it began to fizzle, then,
eventually, plummet into a decade of abysmal economic performance. So, it seems that
institutions are necessary for short-term economic growth, but sustained economic
growth is rather unlikely without good institutions (Green 2011; Rodrik 2006; Rodrik
2008). To be fair, improving institutions will only help in states where the quality of
institutions is the constraining factor.
Rational Peasants
The final area of previous work that is relevant to the research question is that
which address the business and investment acumen of the poor. Samuel Popkin wrote that
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peasants are rational actors who are driven by financial well-being rather than social or
cultural ties (Popkin 1979). Popkin’s peasants are analogous to potential and actual
microfinance customers. When Popkin wrote in 1980, he was trying to debunk a long
standing claim that peasants were more concerned with maintaining their culture, than
with pursuing economic gains (Popkin 1980). The basis of his argument was that
peasants are rational and intelligent enough to know that when they do not have other
prospects, their best option is to rely on the communal village structure to ensure the
well-being of the group. However, when a better opportunity arises, a peasant will
abandon the other villagers in pursuit of her own economic interests. This line of
argument contradicted previous literature, which claimed that villagers put great value on
the communal village structure, and it was only influence from outside, what scholars
today might call globalization, which caused villagers to cut their ties and adopt a new,
independent financial path. The basic premise of this argument is that peasants, who are
generally not very well educated, would be able to make those kinds of decisions with
enough accuracy to be of benefit.
The essence of Popkin’s argument is that peasants are rational, economically
motivated actors. In other words, peasants are rational consumers and strategic investors.
This idea agrees with the basic premise of microfinance, that the poor are able to make
strategic decisions about their financial situations and prospects. Some poverty
alleviation and development approaches do not make this assumption. Foreign aid, for
example, does not put the onus of rational decision making on the poor. It relies, instead,
on decision makers within the governments of the donor state and the recipient state to
make the decisions about the application of those resources. This is where Easterly argues
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that aid tends to fail (Easterly 2006). Decision makers at the governmental level, whether
in the donor state or the recipient state, have a terrible track record for making decisions
about the allocation of resources in order to bring about discernible improvements in the
quality of life or economic well-being of the poor on a large scale. Likewise, FDI, when
directed to a less-developed state, generally reserves decision making for the wealthy
investors from a developed state (Balaam and Dillman 2011).
The basic premise of microfinance, on the other hand, is that the poor are
intelligent enough, and educated enough to make efficient financial decisions. This is an
idea that numerous scholars have embraced. Amartya Sen, the Nobel laureate in
economics, argued on many occasions that freedom is key for development (Sen 1999).
Sen argued that true development occurs when people in poor countries are given the
opportunity to pursue their own best interests. When people have the freedom to pursue
their personal political interests, as in a democracy, they choose leaders who champion
their causes. In the same fashion, people who have the freedom to access financial
services, to borrow money in order to start or expand a microenterprise, or to invest in
human capital or in making a home operate more efficiently, will improve their quality of
life and their own productivity. After all, nearly everybody and virtually every country
was dismally poor just a few hundred years ago, relative to today’s standards (Easterly
2001). Many of them were able to rapidly increase their incomes rather quickly at some
point. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that peasants in Thai villages or the poorer
classes in Latin American societies might be able to do the same when the constraints on
their economic productivity are alleviated. Microfinance is an attempt to alleviate what
might be a constraint for many people in developing countries by providing them
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opportunities to expand their growth potential beyond what their present incomes allow
by leveraging their income. After all, leveraging is how the wealthy generally increase
their wealth.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the poor in modern societies are
quite rational. Collins, et al (2009) conducted a study in which they tracked the financial
transactions of poor households for approximately two years. Researchers asked each
household in the study about their income, expenditures, and how they saved and
borrowed money on a bi-weekly basis over the course of 12 – 24 months. One of their
most important findings was that poor households in the countries they studied often
engaged in rather complex financial interactions with friends, neighbors and family
members, employers, retailers and occasionally loan sharks, in order to meet their
financial needs. They point out that poor people in most countries are likely to have
facilities in their towns or villages which provide public services, such as schools or
health clinics. It is likely, though, that those public services do not function very well.
Those same people are considerably less likely to have an institution in their municipality
which offers financial services that they can access. “Microfinance’s advantage in this
race is that it can pursue the task of delivering reliable and affordable services to the poor
independent of public resources. It can also operate with less dependence on political
will…” (Collins et al 2009, 176).
Conclusion
The research question raised in the first chapter touches several fields of study.
This chapter has presented and discussed the major connections to the different groups of
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previous research that are relevant to this project. The major groups of literature include
previous research and approaches to studying microfinance, different ways of thinking
about risk and how it affects decision making behavior, political and economic stability
and their relationship to poverty alleviation and development efforts, and, finally, the
rational peasant argument and how it applies to microfinance.
The microfinance literature was divided into three groups. The early literature
tended to focus on how to get loan money to people with no credit history and no
collateral in such a way as to incentivize them to repay their loans. Another group of
literature focused on the development of and differences between non-profit
microfinance, as from an NGO, and profit driven microfinance. The final group of
microfinance literature, and the group that is most closely related to the research question
here, address the impact of microfinance. It tries to determine whether microfinance
improves the quality of life of the poor, or not.
The section on the risk literature discussed the development of expected utility
theory, which is the method used to discuss risk in subsequent chapters. It also addressed
one of a handful of critiques of the expected utility model, but showed that many scholars
still rely on the expected utility model because subsequent modifications introduced a
considerable degree of complexity without making predictions all that much better. The
following section on instability showed that other mechanisms for poverty alleviation and
development tend to be sensitive to the functioning of the state and markets. There are
some reasons to believe that microfinance might not respond to instability in the same
way that foreign aid does, for example.
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The last section of this chapter discussed Popkin’s rational peasant argument and
related it to a variety of development efforts (Popkin 1980). Some of these development
efforts, such as foreign aid, give the decision making power to elites and policy makers.
Microfinance, on the other hand, allows the poor to make the decisions about their own
financial lives. This section also discussed the work of other scholars who have argued
and shown that the latter approach may be more efficient.

31

CHAPTER 3
A Model of Poverty Reduction

In this chapter I set out to develop and explain a model of how government
bureaucracy and policies influence the microfinance industry within a state and the
effects on poverty reduction. The model will then inform the empirical analyses in
chapters four and five. The model, once constructed, will reveal how I expect the various
moving parts to fit together and interact with one another. More precisely, it will clearly
explain how I believe government actions, or inactions, affect microfinance and poverty.
By implication, it will also reveal where microfinance should be most effective based on
the assumptions I employ.
Key Terms and Concepts
There are some key terms and concepts that came up in the first chapter and
which will continue to appear throughout the rest of this work. They are common terms,
though used with specific meanings here. Before moving into a discussion of the model
itself, this section will discuss these terms and their precise meanings for this study.
The first term is government. When government is mentioned herein, it is a
reference to the ruling authority of the state, generally with references to the actions taken
by said party. Political scientists and economists often use the term “governance”, as
evidenced by the World Bank's data set of World Governance Indicators; a group of
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indicators that generally measure the quality or functioning of the bureaucracy in a state.
The indicators include measures of the rule of law and functioning of the courts. These
are precisely the things that might affect microfinance and poverty, however, in the
microfinance literature governance often refers to an MFI's management and leadership
(Thapa 2010; Roodman 2012). So calling them by a term that includes “governance”
could get confusing. I recognize that describing these institutions and their actions as
government policy and bureaucracy is cumbersome, but for the sake of clarity I choose to
employ the more cumbersome term and for the sake of clarity I avoid the use of
“governance” altogether.
Another important term for clarification is microfinance. Although the early roots
of the microfinance movement, which was often accurately called micro-credit, and
which focused on non-profit organizations making small, short-term loans to groups of
people, microfinance has evolved considerably. MFIs today often accept or even require
customer's deposits into a savings account. Some offer forms of insurance, education and
health care to their customers as well. Moreover, MFIs today might choose to offer loans
on an individual basis, or for terms that go well beyond a few weeks or months as in the
early days of the Grameen Bank (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005; Dowla and
Barua 2006; Collins et al 2009; Roodman 2012). Another significant shift includes the
rising involvement of for-profit organizations in the microfinance industry. Some
commercial banks and other types of investors have begun establishing operation in the
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microfinance sector and earn profits by doing so.1 While lending is still the primary
activity of most MFIs, it is all part of microfinance.
The third term is poverty reduction. In the economics and political science
literatures, not to mention the policy world, there are many measures and definitions of
poverty. Some rely on thresholds that cut across cultural divisions, economic variations
and all other differences, such as the $1/day threshold. The precise measurement of
poverty is an issue for the next chapter, suffice it to say that the poor are those who
struggle to meet basic needs, such as sufficient nutrition, clean water, clothing and
shelter. There is little dispute about who scholars are talking about when they mention the
poor, but there is more disputation about what poverty reduction means. Some focus
exclusively on economic characteristics such as whether a family lives on less than
$1/day per person. In this study I take poverty reduction to include anything that
improves the quality of life of the poor, or even near poor. I prefer a broad understanding
because much of the economic life of the poor, especially those in poorer countries,
occurs in the grey market where it is difficult or impossible to track by quantitative
statistics. Also, it is easy to imagine mechanisms for improving the quality of life of an
individual without changing her economic status. For example, smoothing a person's
income reduces the temptation to spend extra income during good times and the stress of
finding food during difficult times. Improving health might not have any discernible

These for-profit MFIs often have a “double bottom-line”. That is, they are meant to be
profitable, but that is not their only objective. They also try to improve the quality of life
of the poor.
1
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effect on a person's income, but most people would agree that feeling physically well
improves quality of life. It is not difficult to think of many more examples.
What We 'Know' So Far
This project is by no means the first to delve into microfinance, poverty
alleviation, or the economic effects of government actions. This project jumps off from a
platform created by other researchers. Research suggests, for example, that government
has a significant effect on foreign aid. Significant instances of political instability, such as
coups d'etat decrease not only economic development but also the effectiveness of
foreign aid (Chauvet and Guillamont 2003; Hubbard and Duggan 2009). The same is true
of FDI, although it is also affected by corruption, regulation, state capability, rule of law,
and much more (Driver et al 2004; Busse and Hefeker 2007; Daude and Stein 2007;
Kolstad and Villanger 2008; Hunt and Laszlo 2012).
If foreign aid and FDI are both sensitive to government actions, it seems likely
that microfinance should be as well. There are two ways of looking at this though. On the
one hand, microfinance is another financial mechanisms that is hoped, or suggested, to be
able to help the poor. This is accurate as far as it goes. On the other hand, microfinance
occurs at the individual level, rather than the state level as in foreign aid and FDI. This
unique feature casts doubt on the assertion that microfinance follows the same pattern as
foreign aid and FDI.
Previous research has also made clear that poverty reduction is an elusive
objective. Quite often, $millions are spent on aid with no perceptible change in poverty
(Easterly 2006; Collier 2007; Hubbard and Dugan 2009). Researchers continue to try and
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understand why this is the case, but there seem to be a host of factors that impede poverty
alleviation. Collier (2007) calls them the poverty traps; these are often structural
characteristics that make development and economic growth nearly impossible, such as
being land-locked with poor neighbors. Poor governance and recurring conflict also seem
to inhibit economic success. Even where conditions seem to be ripe for economic growth,
poverty alleviation and development still lie only along a hard fought road (Dowla and
Barua 2006; Moser 2007).
Finally, recent research by Collins et al (2009) offers strong evidence that the poor
need, and often use financial services. In some cases they use it to smooth consumption
when income is uneven, as for farmers, and even many factory workers. They also use
financial services to make large lump sum purchases and even to invest money for the
future. The poor do all of this while calculating their risks, if only crudely. For the poor
face many of the same risks the rest do, such as illness, poor harvests, slow business
cycles or death. However, they are in an even weaker position to deal with risks than the
rest because a single illness could cost them everything (Krishna 2010; Roodman 2012).
Despite all of this and the fact that the poor tend to be poorly educated, they are generally
well aware of their finances and often manage them rather astutely (Collins et al 2009).
The Major Players
There are three major players in the function of microfinance that are the focus of
this study. The first is the government. The government has the role of choosing to
regulate or not regulate the microfinance industry. Some governments, such as in Bolivia,
take a very laisse faire approach (Roodman 2012; Accion.org). The policies and
regulations the Bolivian government has established have been designed to be of mutual
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benefit to MFIs and customers. On the other hand, states like Nicaragua and India have
taken a very different approach, imposing interest rate caps or limiting the amounts and
durations of loans. Another important characteristic of the government which has already
been mentioned, is the capability and will to create a well-functioning bureaucracy.
Whether the bureaucracy is inefficient because of limited state capability or a lack of
political will makes no difference. The outcome is the same. The government also
determines whether the state is at war, either internally or externally, the nature of the
state's economic and political relationships. All of which might affect the strength of the
economy and the investment climate.
Second, are MFIs. This is, perhaps, the most obvious player in the microfinance
industry, especially if one assumes that there are plenty of poor people who need
financial services and are simply price takers. Under those assumptions it falls to the
MFIs to determine how to structure their services to maximize profits, outreach or
impact. Indeed, depending on the state, MFIs often have endless configurations of loan
sizes, durations, installment structures, requirements for subsequent loans, group
dynamics and more. In some cases they are part of an international network of financial
institutions. In other cases they are independent of other institutions. Quite often they are
the product of an NGO, or sometimes they are an auxiliary of the state. In any case, it is
the MFI that provides the services; its managers and investors must decide whether and
how to fund it and the shape and nature of its business.
The third actor whose decisions matter is the customer. Customers, I assume, are
not mindless machines who will take loans at any price because their discount rate is so
high. Rather, customers are generally cautious individuals who are aware of how saving
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and borrowing money affects them over the short and long-terms (Collins et al 2009).
This makes sense when one realizes that the poor generally have access to micro-credit
by borrowing money from loan sharks, but avoid doing so because it is so expensive.
The choices and actions of these three players are at the root of the structure of
microfinance in countries around the world. More importantly for this study, the
government and MFIs affect the poverty or quality of life of the customer. The MFI is
regulated, or not, by the government and is generally designed to serve the poor. The
customer is often the target audience for the regulations the government might impose on
the microfinance sector and the clientele and purpose of the MFI.
How It All Fits Together
The remainder of this chapter will discuss how the key actors behave; their
motivations and decision making calculus. First, I will discuss assumptions about the
actors that are key to understanding how they behave. Second, I explain why risk is key
in microfinance decision making and how it shapes the actors involved. The final section
details how all of this translates to the real world; what the relationships should look like
and how they should function.
Assumptions
It becomes useful to make a few simple assumptions about the actors. All actors
are assumed to fit the patterns typical of economic theories. Microfinance customers are
assumed to be homeconomicus, driven to any and all actions by the desire to maximize
utility. They understand that an action A leads to an outcome Y with a certain degree of
probability P. They know the cost of A and their valuation of Y, but P presents an
unknown. Therefore, individuals make decisions based on an expected utility, or the
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value of Y less the cost of A, and discounted according to the degree of uncertainty
accorded by P. An actor, though rational, might not seek her most desired outcome, even
when the cost of doing so is small, if the probability of the desired outcome is too low.
MFIs and states are equally engaged in maximizing their utility. Their objectives and
calculations are similar to those of the individual.
I also assume that all actors involved have a reasonably accurate understanding of
the effects of policies, political events and economic conditions. Individual customers are
almost certainly uneducated in the formal study of economics, but it is not unreasonable
to assume that they understand the ins and outs of their industry of employment. For
example, a factory worker understands that, depending on the industry, there might be
busy times when income will be good, and there might be slow times when income will
be poor (Collins et al 2009). A farmer knows that income arrives when he sells his crops,
and he will likely get a better price if he can wait until several months after the harvest
when supply begins to wane before he sells his produce (Sen 1999). The street merchant
understands that if the government implements a law that requires street vendors to have
a permit of some sort it might be worth shirking on the permit and paying bribes to local
officials that will allow him to continue vending. It is clear that the poor, like most
members of the working class worldwide, are familiar with their industry and have a
certain degree of understanding about how government policies, political events and
economic conditions might affect their incomes.
The Role of Risk
Risk is the key to understanding the concerns and motivations that drive the
decisions of MFIs and their customers. It can come from a number of sources and plagues
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all parties to a greater or lesser degree. Consider first the MFI. Its purpose is to provide
financial services to the poor. One of the key services upon which most focus a great deal
of their attention is the provision of credit. Extending credit has always been a risky
venture. This is the case for MFIs as well. Risk is inherent in giving loans because the
lender cannot know for certain whether the borrower will repay the money. Lenders try to
mitigate the uncertainty by ascertaining the borrower's income, or ability to repay, or
whether she has a history of repaying debts according to contract.
This is often more difficult for MFIs because this information is rarely formally
available. The states in which MFIs often operate are unlikely to have functioning credit
bureaus that track an individual's credit history. So the MFI can't know whether a
potential borrower has failed to repay past loans, or is already heavily indebted, thus
making him unlikely to be able to repay an additional loan. To exacerbate the situation,
the poor often work in the informal sector, so there are no formal records of income.
Therefore, the MFI cannot verify a customer's income and whether she is likely to be able
to pay the agreed upon installments.
Traditional lenders also mitigate risk by holding some sort of collateral. Collateral
might be in the form of a title to a vehicle or a deed to a house. But, again, with MFIs this
is not generally an option since the poor have very little of value, and what they do have
may well not be a formally owned, moveable property.
The key to microfinance's success is finding innovative ways to work around
these problems. They often get around the lack of information about credit history and
ability to repay loans by using a group lending mechanism. Then the group leverages
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information about other village members to select for those who are most reliable and
sufficiently able to make installments.
Group lending also helps overcome the problem of a lack of collateral. Especially
when coupled with lending schemes that allow for increasingly larger and more favorable
loans. Then the other members of the group often have an incentive to repay a loan, even
pressuring a shirking member or covering his payments if necessary, in order to secure
future loans. MFIs might also rely on forced savings or other similar mechanisms to
ensure that customers have a real incentive to repay their loans and an accrued collateral
if they do not.
Despite these and other mechanisms MFIs have developed and implemented to
counter uncertainty, they cannot eliminate it. None of these mechanisms is fool-proof.
Moreover, there is yet another source of uncertainty against which there is little an MFI
can do to insulate itself. That is the uncertainty of future conditions. The MFI cannot
know whether the economy will fall into recession and make loan repayment impossible
for its customers. It cannot know whether the government will institute policies such as
Nicaragua's No Pago! (“I won't pay”) campaign that could wipe out large portions of
their capital. Some of these events might be predicted as a possibility, but many are
unforeseen.
When investors consider putting money into an MFI in a given country these are
all things they must consider. They look at the economic outlook for the state and think
about whether micro-enterprises will be successful and the economy stable. They look at
whether there exists a reliable credit bureau or similar institution, whether the legal
system is mature enough that the MFI would be able to rely on courts to enforce contracts
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and whether the legal system acknowledges private property rights and such. All these
concerns play into the calculus of the investor.
Risk also generally influences the poor in their decisions whether to borrow or not
and whether to repay or not. While some of the poor borrow money without regard for
their ability to repay it in the future, most are well aware of their finances and what they
are capable of (Dowla and Barua 2006; Collins 2009). A poor person, who is a potential
customer for an MFI faces risk from multiple sources. First, there is a risk that stems
from the inherent uncertainty surrounding the types of employment in which they often
engage. Street vendors have good days, when their goods sell well and they make a good
profit, and bad days, when they make little or no profit. Another common employment in
some countries is that of taxi driver, whether bicycle taxi, motorcycle taxi, or otherwise.
There are good days and bad days. Farmers deal with the uncertainty which stems from
the variability in weather conditions. Not enough rain and the crops wither, but too much
and they don't do well either. Or even the right amount of rain but at the wrong times can
kill a crop or at least decrease harvest. The same is true of temperatures and other natural
phenomena.
All of these uncertainties create risk. There is a risk that the harvest will not be as
large as expected, or that the taxi will need unanticipated repairs, or even that income
earners will be unable to work for some reason. All of these are unknowns that the
customers have to consider (Collins et al 2009). A portion of this risk is passed on to the
MFI as well, since the customer might be unable to repay loans. Fortunately, some MFIs
have become quite adept at creating products that account for these uncertainties and
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allow some flexibility in repayment schedules and lending terms that allow customers to
repay when they are able (Dowla and Barua 2006).
The poor also face uncertainties at the state level. Poor economic conditions
caused by bad governance or simply unfavorable policies to their industry could drive
down incomes. Many of the poor and near-poor work in factories in some countries.
Often these factories export their products overseas which means they are subject to the
political-economic relationships of the states involved. A souring of relations could mean
the factory decreases production and lays off workers, or at least decreases hours. Even
general slowing of economic growth among trade partners could have the same effect.
Moreover, poor countries are far more likely than wealthier, more stable states to be
subject to intra-state conflicts that might upset the economic lives of citizens in the
country (Collier 2007).
Another source of risk comes from functioning of the bureaucracy in many poor
states. Entrepreneurs are often obliged to pay bribes in order to get licenses or permits, or
to avoid even greater fines (Hunt and Laszlo 2012). The poor might also violate
ordinances that are only rarely or weakly enforced in order to increase their profits, but
doing so generally involves the risk of being punished for the violation. Aside from
corruption and its inefficiencies is the question of state capability. In many of the poorest
states the government is not always able to enforce the rule of law all of the time. Collins
et al (2009) tell a story about a rickshaw taxi driver who worked for another person who
owned the rickshaw taxis. The driver received from an MFI a loan large enough to buy a
new rickshaw, which he suggested would increase his profits by as much as 50%. He did
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not buy his own taxi though, because he had nowhere safe to keep it over night and was
afraid that it would be vandalized or stolen during the night.
A single illness could be the difference between a stable, if modest, lifestyle and
abject poverty (Krishna 2010). In fact, one study reports that as much as 1/3 of people
living in poverty in some countries were not born into poverty but fell into it through a
series of unfortunate events (Thapa 2010, 145). The death of an income earner could have
the same effect as a major illness in a family (Collins et al 2009; Roodman 2012).
Risk and uncertainty is inherent in life, whether a person is rich or poor. The
difference lies in the ability to manage risk. An average middle-class American has an
insurance policy to cover nearly every aspect of life – auto, home, life, health, perhaps
disability, or other types of insurance. She also has access to a number of financial
services that can be used as informal insurance, such as credit cards for when unforeseen
costs arise. Home equity lines of credit or personal loans can be used to cover major
expenses, like life cycle events (i.e. weddings, deaths, etc.). The poor, on the other hand,
rarely have access to, or can afford formal insurance. Nor do they always have access to
the variety of legitimate financial services that middle-class Americans do.
Building the Theoretical Model
Answering the research questions posed in the first chapter requires one to think
about microfinance at the individual and the state levels. First, a customer must decide for
him or herself whether to deposit savings, take out a loan or buy insurance with a MFI.
Assuming that these individuals are rational actors, they will take advantage of the
services offered by MFIs only if they believe it is in their own best interest. Since MFIs
generally direct their services to the poor, the customers' interests should be easy to
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deduce. Accepting Maslow's hierarchy of needs as universally applicable, and taking
what we know of the poor in developing countries, those individuals are struggling to
secure their most basic needs, the physiological needs and safety needs (Maslow 1943).
Their behavior should be very predictable; they will do whatever they think is going to
secure those needs. In fact, Collins et al. document this struggle in Portfolios of the Poor
(2009). The families they followed over the course of a year often went to great lengths to
borrow money when necessary, to ensure that their basic needs were met.
Many studies have tried to understand how microfinance affects poverty.
Different studies have come to different conclusions. Some, like David Roodman (2012)
find no significant impact on poverty in randomized controlled trials (Karlan and Zinman
2009; Duvendak 2011), but others are optimistic and find that microfinance improves the
quality of life of customers on a number of different measures (Brau and Woller 2004;
Ahlin and Jiang 2005; Latifee 2011; Odell 2011). The nearly universal problem, though,
is that it does not make sense to think about how microfinance affects poverty in
isolation; governmental policies and regulations must be considered as well. Indeed,
many researchers have addressed the relevance of the state (Duflos and Imboden 2003;
North et al 2008; Rodrik 2008; Collins et al 2009).
There are two distinct, but related effects a state can have. First, the government
plays a role in policy making and regulation of the microfinance industry, which affects
the sustainability and viability of microfinance. Second, governance also affects the
calculus and expectations of poor individuals who might take advantage of microfinance
opportunities. The customer alone must determine whether a micro-loan will be of benefit
when it is available. So the effect of governance is felt at two different stages, first it
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affects the microfinance industry itself, and second, it affects whether the poor are able to
benefit from microfinance.

Figure 3.1: The governance-microfinance-poverty relationship in visual format
Relationship 1
Although there is a great deal about economic development that scholars do not
yet understand very well (Acemoglu 2008), there are some relationships that are
generally accepted and over which the government of a state has some degree of control.
First, government has some degree of influence of the macro-economic stability of the
national economy. Well-functioning states can use a number of tools to control inflation
and money supply. A Keynesian approach to economics helps the government ameliorate
the sting of recession by borrowing against periods of high growth. This smoothes the
sharp ridges and troughs out of the growth curve, making it easier to predict the future
state of the economy with greater accuracy (Gilpin 1987). This makes it easier for
investors and entrepreneurs to begin ventures because they can be more confident about
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future profit margins than in an economy prone to wide swings between growth and
recession.
Second, the government also controls international trade, at least that which
occurs in the formal market. International trade, while it may not have a direct impact on
microfinance, matters for the poor because when terms of trade are more favorable some
industries grow while others do not. The industries in which the state has a comparative
advantage should come to favor large firms and attract FDI and other industries will
likely remain small and relatively insignificant (Barro 1997). Having a stable trade
relationship also means that workers in the trade industry are more likely to have steady,
or at least predictable, incomes. Also, the spillovers of knowledge and technology often
spur growth forward and make it easier for domestic firms to compete in the global
market (Frieden 2006).
Third, governments can spend money on infrastructure to accommodate industrial
growth. Although more important for some industries than others, a good infrastructure
makes economic growth and stability much more likely (Collier 2007). The ability to
transport labor to production facilities and goods to market, or to work continuously
without interruption of electricity or other critical production inputs are crucial for many
industries. Ports, highways and electrical grids tend to be major selling points for
investors because, again, it removes some of the uncertainty of business and allows them
to predict success with greater accuracy.
Fourth, government can invest in human capital. Classical growth models suggest
that expertise, or knowledge, or human capital should be positively correlated with
economic growth (Barro 1997; Easterly 2001). Although the data do not strongly support
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this notion, greater educational opportunities are an element of a higher standard of living
since it opens doors to more careers, not to mention increasing people's ability to
understand and negotiate financial matters.
Finally, implementing social safety net programs reduces poverty directly by
offering food, housing, money or other resources to the poorest in a society. This
increases the probability that basic physical needs are being met, and in so doing relieves
a great deal of stress for those who would be at risk of falling deeper into poverty.
Hypothesis 1: Regardless of the microfinance industry, governments with quality
institutions will have lower poverty levels than governments with poor institutions.
hypothesis 1a: greater economic stability will lead to less poverty
hypothesis 1b: states with better international economic relations will have less
poverty
hypothesis 1c: states with better infrastructure will have less poverty
hypothesis 1d: states with better educational opportunities will have less poverty
hypothesis 1e: states with better social safety nets will have less poverty

Relationship 2
Offering financial services to the poor will improve their standard of living if for
no other reason than that it gives them options. Collins et al (2009) tracked more than 250
households for a full year, interviewing them at least twice each month to find out as
much as they could about their financial lives. It is difficult for people living in
developed, industrialized states to imagine how households living on less than $2 a day
per head could have money to manage, but it turns out that they are often involved in
savings groups or self-help groups, such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
(ROSCAs), borrowing money from friends, family or neighbors and sometimes instead
of, sometimes in addition to borrowing from informal moneylenders. The authors say that
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“money management is, for the poor, a fundamental and well-understood part of
everyday life” (pg 3). Those who are able to do it well are much more likely to improve
their quality of live compared to those who are not as adept. They also say they often
found that “poor households are frustrated by the poor quality – above all the low
reliability – of the instruments that they use to manage their meager incomes” (pg 3).
Microfinance, whether it is heavily regulated or not, is a formal financial option
for the poor, an option that they probably would not have without the locally operating
MFI.2 If an MFI opens a branch in a new village, the villagers may choose not to
patronize the MFI if it is an inferior option to those they already use. However, if it is a
better option, access to financial services through the MFI should make it easier to
manage finances. Logic suggests that if a poor household is relying on being able to
borrow money from friends and family when necessary, or have loaned money and are
relying on it being repaid when necessary, there will be a good deal of uncertainty with
these interactions. As discussed before, one of the greatest challenges that the poor often
face is the irregularity of incomes. A factory slow down, a poor harvest, or a slow day at
the market could mean little or no income for days or weeks. A formal financial
institution introduces a degree of stability. Customers of those MFIs with inflexible
repayments can take loans when they are needed and plan ahead to pay installments.
Often, though, MFIs have flexible repayment schedules to accommodate the irregularity

In fact, many poor still do not have access to MFIs or their services, either because no
MFI has established a branch in their village, or because of constructed social limitations
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005).
2
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of income that tends to plague the poor. The poor still get the loans when they need them,
but can pay when they have income without putting friends or family in a bad situation.
Of course, it is also possible that customers to those MFIs with inflexible payment
schedules might not adequately plan ahead and find themselves subject to collectors with
no ability to pay. Although MFIs seem to be shifting away from those brutal collection
tactics, there is anecdotal evidence that some households have been left much worse off
because they were unable to repay their loans (Roodman 2012). Moreover, it may be
possible for poor households to become over-indebted when they borrow from several
MFIs, or are unable to repay one loan so they take a second to pay the first and a third to
pay the second and so on into financial ruin.
Loans are not the only services that MFIs offer though. Perhaps one of the most
important is savings services (Ahlin and Jiang 2005; Barro 1997; Dupas and Robinson
2010; Islam 2009). Whether because of family members with little self-restraint, or
friends and neighbors wanting to borrow money, poor households often have trouble
holding onto their savings. A jar of money sitting on the mantle is more easily spent than
money that is not easily accessible. To counteract the lack of restraint that most people
tend to struggle with, poor households will sometimes ask other people to hold their
savings for them, or else they loan it to somebody who needs it now, but agrees to repay
before the owner will need it. The problem is that both of these mechanisms are
unreliable. Collins et al (2009) reported, unsurprisingly, that loans were not repaid on
time, or the person holding the money spent it. Once again, having a formal savings
mechanism would remove a great deal of the uncertainty and provide a balance against
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the lack of self-restraint most people suffer from. Admittedly, however, many MFIs are
legally precluded from accepting deposits, and therefore are limited to micro-credit.

Hypothesis 2: Regardless of the quality of government institutions, greater microfinance
outreach will lead to lower poverty levels
While my theoretical reasoning for this project focuses on the role of risk and
uncertainty, which suggest hypothesis 2, the counter argument can, and has been made.
Many experts have suggested that the beneficial effects of microfinance might be washed
out by the harm MFIs do to some households (Karlan and Zinman 2009; Nazrul 2009;
Roodman 2012). Many researchers, both in academia and those working in the private
sphere, have conducted innumerable impact studies to try and determine the precise effect
of microfinance. In fact, guides have been written explaining all of the things a researcher
should consider when conducting an impact study. The results, however, as indicated
previously, have been mixed. The results from the empirical investigation in the next
chapter will by no means constitute a conclusive declaration, but will provide a baseline
against which to compare models that examine the quality of institutions.
Clearly, though, when the government is properly regulating the microfinance
industry and maintains appropriate, well-functioning institutions, the effect of
microfinance should be even greater. Where the rule of law is strictly enforced, for
example, the rickshaw taxi driver from the anecdote above would not have to forego
buying his own rickshaw for fear that it would be vandalized or stolen. There are some
specific institutions that might make microfinance more effective, as well as some
institutional characteristics within the government that might explain microfinance
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effectiveness. Some of the specific institutions that might matter because they affect risk
and uncertainty include credit bureaus or similar institutions, effective law enforcement,
and functioning courts. Some characteristics of governmental institutions that matter for
the same reasons include the origin of the legal system, state capability, the state's
approach to regulating microfinance, and political and economic stability.
The existence of credit bureaus is something that many people in industrialized
states take for granted. In fact, in the United States there are three such credit bureaus
which track individuals' credit histories and several others which track commercial
entities' credit histories. An entire cottage industry has arisen around these institutions
claiming to be able to help improve an individual's credit rating, or protecting credit
ratings in the event of identity theft or other forms of fraud. In many developing states,
there is no such institution. Where the government has difficulty simply tracking vital
statistics and where much of the economy is in the informal sphere, tracking credit
histories would be nearly impossible. When a lender knows little or nothing about a
potential borrower and has no way of knowing the borrower's credit history, the lender
would quickly meet financial ruin if it lent them money. For one thing, the borrower
would have no incentive to repay the loan since she could simply go to another lender the
next time she needed money. For another, even if the borrower were honest and genuinely
planned to repay the loan, the lender still would not be able to calculate the appropriate
loan size, installments and duration, or interest rate. The uncertainty would almost
necessarily lead to inefficiencies, either the lender charging too much, thus hurting the
borrower, or charging too little, and hurting itself.
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The only assurance a borrower could offer a lender would be collateral. This
could come in many forms including titles or deeds to property, or valuable possessions.
The problem with this is that the poor have nothing valuable enough to use as collateral
for loans of any meaningful size. Even their homes are often located on land they do not
own and constructed such that their financial values are little more than a heap of scrap
wood and sheet metal. As discussed before, MFIs have come up with innovative ways
around these problems, but their solutions are not always ideal. For example, group
lending models almost inherently require a certain rigidity in their repayment schedules
since if the group were allowed to miss or delay payments, group members would have
less incentive to pressure each other to make their individual contributions. Late
payments by individuals and the group would spiral out of control and fall into a tragedy
of the commons. The rigid schedules, though, do not allow an MFI to tailor a financial
service to a specific customer's needs. Since the poor often struggle with inconsistent
incomes, rigid repayment schedules reduce the utility of a micro-loan. All of this could be
avoided if the MFI knew more about the individual's financial history and how well she
maintained her finances, and had a mechanism for punishing defectors who do not repay
loans.
Other institutions, such as the rule of law, which might also be stated as a
functioning, reliable, honest police force, likely augment the effect of microfinance. The
rule of law and corruption both deal with predatory behavior that distorts the market and
decreases efficiency and competitiveness (Hall and Jones 1999). The rule of law
mitigates violence and ensures the security of the person, protects property rights through
contract enforcement and efficient institutions. It also serves as an institutional check
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against government to counter the government's ability, and perhaps its incentive, to
renege on agreements, regulates private capture and limits corruption by ensuring equal
treatment and avoiding rent-seeking behavior (Haggard and Tiede 2011). While some
people engage in productive behavior, such as farming, others might engage in predatory
behavior such as stealing the farmer's crops, or bureaucratic corruption by eliciting bribes
to allow the farmer to sell his crops at the local market without interference. So the rule
of law should help reduce at least a portion of predatory behavior, and thereby reduce the
portion of productive labor devoted to guarding against thieves and such. Likewise,
corruption reduces the farmer's efficiency since bribes must be paid from what would
otherwise be profits (Mauro 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
The final institution mentioned here is the court system. An efficient legal system
is crucial for economic progress because it ensures that an individual has recourse if
property or productive capacity should be damaged (Globerman and Shapiro 2002; Hall
and Jones 1999). For the farmer described above, if somebody should manage to steal his
crops, or, depending on how well established the legal system is, if there arose a dispute
over a contract to sell his crops, the farmer can take the grievance to the courts for
compensation. An efficient system will hear the farmer's complaints and make a decision
based on the merits of the case rather than the judge's political or financial interests. This
ensures the farmer that even if something bad should happen, he will be able to seek
reparations. It also ensures all parties involved that they can make formal agreements in
the form of contracts, and the courts are available to fairly and efficiently arbitrate
disputes.
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The legitimate functioning of each of these institutions should increase the
poverty reduction effectiveness of microfinance. Each institution has a direct effect on the
entities involved in microfinance and their proper functioning would decrease uncertainty
and risk, thus making the relationships more efficient and profitable. However, it is not
only the existence of certain institutions that matters. Certain characteristics of these and
other institutions, indeed the bureaucracy as a whole, will likely impact microfinance.
The first of these characteristics is the origin of the legal system. The origin of the
legal system has a major impact on property rights, creditor rights and the development
of the banking sector (Beck 2002; La Porta et al 1999). Common law was developed in
England and relies heavily on court decisions to interpret the law and protect the rights of
Parliament and property owners from the sovereign and its attempts to regulate, or even
expropriate (La Porta et al 1999). Civil law, on the other hand, was developed more by
the sovereign, beginning with the Roman civil code and later the French civil law, to be
used as an instrument of state building and economic control (Garner 2001). Beginning
with Adam Smith in 1776, economists have often said that protection of property rights is
crucial to a well-functioning economy. Moreover, the French legal tradition tends to be
relatively rigid while the common law tradition, by virtue of allowing judges to interpret
laws under unanticipated circumstances, is much more flexible. More flexibility allows
the legal system to adapt to the constantly changing world while the French system does
not (Beck et al 2002).3

3 Germany,

although it adopted a civil law tradition, embraced the need for jurisprudence
and sought to create a legal system that was responsive to change. So although it is a civil
law system, it more closely resembles English common law than French civil law.
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In terms of microfinance this means that countries with more flexible systems will
be better able to make decisions concerning disputes based on the merits of the case
rather than simply relying on existing laws. Again, this has generally led to stronger
protection of private property, which should give MFI customers a greater degree of
certainty regarding their possessions. Perhaps more importantly, the characteristics of the
common law tradition offer the MFIs greater certainty. They can be more confident that
their property will be protected and that courts will recognize them as something different
from a traditional, highly capitalized bank. A higher degree of certainty for the MFI
allows them to operate more efficiently, and they can pass those savings on to customers
in one form or another.
Another important characteristic is the degree of stability. Political and economic
stability are intimately related since the government plays a major role in promoting
economic stability and economic stability often plays a major role in promoting
satisfaction with the government and, therefore, its longevity. Economic stability includes
a whole host of variables from the stability of the currency to the stability of interest
rates, exchange rates, tax rates and so on. It also includes the degree of variation in
economic growth rates. All of this matters because of its effect on risk and uncertainty.
The more interest rates or inflation go up and down, the less confident a microentrepreneur or a household can be that it is either getting a better rate now than it could
if it waited a few months, or that an investment now will be an asset rather than a liability
in a few months. This relationship is quite straightforward and needs little explanation or
clarification. Economic stability is the justification for all kinds of economic
manipulation by governments around the world. They overspend during recessions,
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knowing they will have to underspend later to compensate, in effect borrowing from
tomorrow's economic growth to ease today's recession (Heilbroner 1999). It is the reason
governments manipulate monetary policy, because they fear deflation like the plague and
rampant inflation like the flu. It was the reason for the provision of a gold standard under
the Bretton Woods system (Gilpin 1987). It is all done for the sake of economic stability.
The more certain an actor can be of future profits, the more efficiently she can maximize
the efficiency of her investments today. Governments play a major role in promoting,
even creating, economic stability and economic stability plays a major role in individual
or household level financial decisions.
Stability plays an important role because it serves as the primary indicator of
future conditions. If the government retains power the farmer knows more or less what to
expect in terms of the costs of production and the values or prices paid for certain goods.
If the government is unstable, on the other hand, the farmer's uncertainty about the future
will act as a deterrent against behavior with any associated risk.
Potential customers or entrepreneurs should be more hesitant to start a
microenterprise if they are uncertain whether they will be able to turn a profit and repay
their loan on time if the business climate should sour (Islam 2009). What might be a safe
business venture in a stable economy becomes a risk with potentially large losses, and
probably no greater profits, in an unstable or unpredictable economy. The expected
utility, based on the probability of success and the likely payoffs from either outcome,
quickly shrinks to zero or goes into the negative when uncertainty increases risk (Driver
et al 2004; Most and Starr 1989).
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In traditional finance and investment, investors only make risky investments if the
payoff is large enough to balance the risk. At the same time, both theory and history have
shown that investing too much in a risky venture can be devastating (Ferguson 2009).
Wise investors prefer, instead, to diversify their portfolios; they put some money in sure
fire investments with low yield, and some in higher risk investments that might be high
yield if the investment is successful. For micro-credit borrowers, however, the loans
offered to them often represent large investments relative to their regular income. Since
the poor, by definition, do not have other large investments, they have a lot riding on their
ability to successfully improve their standard of living with the loans they take. Theory
and experience both suggest that they should be very sensitive to risk (Ferguson 2009). I
assume that they have good information about risk since they are presumably investing in
a venture with which they are already familiar or even already involved (de Aghion and
Morduch 2005).
General economic theory has been making these connections for several years
(Easterly 2001; Easterly 2006; Haggard and Tiede 2011; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Although there are only a few examples of researchers
making this connection in the microfinance literature (see Ault and Spicer 2009 as an
example), the FDI literature has clearly established the empirical link between the quality
of government institutions and investment, both in terms of its prevalence and its success
(Driver et al 2004; Daude and Stein 2007).
An uncertain market is typically not one that attracts investment because investors
find it more difficult to predict their expected utility. That is to say, with any investment
there is a risk of loss. Generally the return on the investment, call it a payoff, must be
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high enough that an investor is willing to take the risk, which might also be called the
possibility of failure. A safe bet, such as a US treasury bill, which carries virtually zero
risk, pays little interest so the payoff is small (Ferguson 2009). On the other hand,
investing in a start-up technology company is quite risky, but the potential payoff is quite
large. When the market experiences high uncertainty it is, by definition, difficult to
calculate the risk. In terms familiar to quantitative scholars, risk is a point estimate while
uncertainty is a confidence interval. Political instability might both cause the confidence
interval to expand and change the point estimate of the risk, although it is impossible to
know by how much since the confidence interval is even larger than normal. Stated
another way, when there is little instability an investor knows what he does not know,
risk, but when uncertainty is high, the investor cannot be sure about what he does not
know. Uncertainty generally compels investors to delay investment while they gather
additional information (Cukierman 1980). This is especially true for poorer individuals
who might be risking a great deal when they take a loan from an MFI (Binswanger 1980).
I expect microfinance to be no exception.

Hypothesis 3: The higher the quality of governmental institutions, the greater the poverty
reduction effect of microfinance.
hypothesis 3a: the existence of a credit bureau should increase the poverty
reduction effect of microfinance
hypothesis 3b: the higher the institutional quality of the police force in a
country the more effective microfinance should be for poverty reduction
hypothesis 3c: the higher the institutional quality of the court system in a
country the more effective microfinance should be for poverty reduction
hypothesis 3d: states with English and German legal origins should reap
greater benefit from microfinance than states with French legal origins
hypothesis 3e: states whose laws and regulations promote microfinance
should see greater benefit to the poor than states that focus exclusively on
59

protecting the poor from MFIs
hypothesis 3f: states with greater economic/political stability should see more
poverty reduction from microfinance than less stable states

Conclusion
In chapter one I raised a research question; how might a government affect
whether and how much microfinance reduces poverty? This chapter discussed the
mechanisms by which governments could be influencing the microfinance industry and
how it influences the lives of the poor. Risk and uncertainty are key to understanding
these relationships. They are an integral part of any rational investment decision, whether
made by a bank or non-banking financial institution (NBFI), an enterprise, or a
household. All must ask themselves, 'what if the worst should happen?' The response to
such a question, along with its associated probability and the expected utility of the
investment, colors the investor's willingness and expectations. I make the case that
greater certainty leads to more efficient investments and vice versa.
The key point made in this chapter, though, is that governments can have a major
impact on uncertainty and risk. The quality and functioning of institutions such as credit
bureaus, police forces and legitimate courts decrease risk. Likewise, the institutional
characteristics within the state matter too. Such characteristics as legal origin, and
political/economic stability can change the risk calculus as well.
In the next two chapters I will test these relationships using empirical data. In
chapter four I rely on quantitative data sets to perform large N statistical analyses of the
hypotheses and in chapter five I elaborate on the mechanisms and relationships discussed
in this chapter through a case study analysis. Together they will provide some
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information about whether or not governments affect microfinance through their
institutions, and if so, how.
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CHAPTER 4
Quantitative Analysis

In the case of microfinance, it seems very likely that the quality of governance at
the state level, and the institutions and conditions within which the MFIs must operate,
influence the intended outcomes of microfinance. However, it would also be very
interesting to find that governance does not affect microfinance. I find mixed results.
Some hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence while others are not supported.
More precisely, political institutions and political stability do not seem to have a much
effect on microfinance, but economic and financial stability do.
Operationalizing Microfinance, Governance and Poverty
Before moving on to discuss the data and results, I will first explain how the
concepts discussed in the previous chapter will be measured for the analyses below. Key
to the theory detailed in chapter three is the concept of microfinance. Discussing
microfinance as a component of a dynamic relationship is simple, but measuring it is a bit
more difficult. Many past studies, when they discuss microfinance, focus on the strength
of the industry. Scholars have looked at microfinance profitability, durability, loan
repayment information, and much more (Brau and Woller 2004; de Aghion and Morduch
2005; Schicks 2007; Ault and Spicer 2009). The relationships described in the previous
chapter are clearly focused on individual level effects for the microfinance customers.
Measures of industry wide characteristics, then, are inappropriate for this analysis.
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Microfinance can impact individuals in two ways. First, it matters whether or not
individuals who want loans are able to get them. Some sort of measure that captures, if
not the precise probability that the individual gets a loan when she needs it, then an
approximation of that data. Getting the perfect data would require an extremely extensive
survey of not only microfinance customers, but also non-customers who might or might
not have desired a loan at some time. Such an undertaking would be very useful, but is
beyond the scope of the current project. For now, I approximate this data by examining
the number of borrowers within the microfinance industry as a percentage of the total
population of each country in each year.
Admittedly, there are problems that make this measure less than ideal. For example,
many customers, depending on the MFI and the country, might take and repay multiple
loans in a given year, possibly from multiple MFIs. That is not captured by this measure.
It also does not provide any information about people who would like to get a loans, but
are unable to do so. On the other hand, it is a useful measure because it provides an
indication of how extensive the microfinance industry is. Where the industry is tenuous,
few loans will be offered to fewer customers. A country where relatively more people are
able to secure loans indicates that loans are relatively easier to get. Therefore, this
measure approximates the desired information.
Another characteristic of microfinance that is important for this analysis is how
meaningful those loans are. Where the industry is weak or nascent and lacks resources,
loans are likely to not only be less common, but smaller too (de Aghion and Morduch
2005; Roodman 2012). The MFIs are unable to open additional branches, advertise their
services, or offer more loans. Where the MFIs have the resources, though, the
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microfinance industry can grow according to demand. The value of assets across the
entire microfinance industry within a country-year captures this nicely. To keep the
measure consistent across states, it is divided by GDP to account for variations in the size
of economies.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics I
Variable

Observatio
ns

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Infant Mortality

420

27.893

13.442

7.7

83.5

Improved Sanitation
Improved Water Source
Risk for Exchange Rate
Risk for GDP Growth
Risk for Inflation
Risk for per capita GDP
Imports
Exports
FDI

405
405
549
546
512
549
400
400
432

73.689
87.499
7.353
6.349
6.432
1.943
18932.22
18524.85
0.031

18.157
7.881
2.608
2.360
2.656
1.056
43928.33
41021.57
0.041

18
52
0
0
0
0
210.57
91.37
-0.192

100
100
10
10
10
8
339464
291343
0.398

Both of these indicators, as well as the measure of outreach – or the degree to
which MFIs are servicing the very poor or rural populations, as opposed to the not-sopoor, nearly-poor, and urban populations – used to test hypothesis 2 all come from one of
the primary source of data on microfinance; the Microfinance Information Exchange
(MIX). The MIX collects extensive data on microfinance institutions from around the
world. Most of the data is self-reported, though it is often spot-checked to verify its
accuracy. It is possible that this data collection process may introduce some skewed
information, but it is widely regarded as valid and commonly used in microfinance
research (de Aghion and Morduch 2005; Ault and Spicer 2009; Morduch 2010; Thapa
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2010). If there is any bias in the data, it is likely only a slight under-representation of
smaller MFIs (Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch 2011).
These are the key explanatory variables, but there are other important concepts
whose operationalizations deserve discussion. Beginning with hypothesis 1, in subhypothesis A economic stability is captured using two indicators, inflation of consumer
prices and and GDP per capita growth, in other words, the change in GDP from the
previous year. To test sub-hypothesis B I use two indicators to capture the quality of
economic relationships; they are international trade, both imports and exports, and FDI
flows. In sub-hypothesis C the percentage of the population with access to improved
sanitation facilities and improved water sources are used to capture the quality of
infrastructure in the state.
I use factor analysis, a latent variable model, to simplify these concepts from
several indicators down to a single measure for each. The logic behind factor analysis is
that there is a latent variable that causes the indicators that are directly measured. From
the data on the indicators it is possible to get an idea of what the latent variable driving
the indicators looks like (Agresti and Finlay 2002). It is then possible to test the concepts
against one another without getting lost in how one indicator might affect another
indicator.
The ratio of female to male primary enrollment is a proxy for the quality of
educational opportunities for sub-hypotheses D. Finally, public health expenditures as a
share of total health care costs proxies for the extent of social safety nets in a state. All of
these data come directly from the World Bank or the Penn World Tables (Heston,
Summers and Aten 2012).
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Table 4.2: Factor Loadings and Uniqueness
Economic
Stability

Infrastructure
Improved Sanitation
Facilities

Improved Water Source

Economic
Relations

0.786
0.383
0.786
0.383

Risk for Exchange Rate

0.807
0.350

Risk for GDP Growth

0.773
0.402

Risk for Inflation

0.647
0.582

Risk for Per Capita GDP

-0.343
0.883

Imports

0.986
0.028

Exports

0.982
0.037

FDI

0.764
0.416

Note: factor loadings above and uniqueness below
In testing hypothesis 3 I draw on the World Bank for data on private and public
credit bureau coverage; the World Bank's World Governance Indicators for the rule of law
indicator; the Economist Intelligence Unit for measures of the microfinance regulatory
environment (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011); and the commercially produced
International Country Risk Guide for measures of political, economic, financial and
composite risk.
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All of these data are collected to test the variables' hypothesized relationships on
poverty. While poverty seems like a simple concept at first blush, measuring it turns out
to be a bit complicated. The first hurtle any measure of poverty must address is what
poverty line to adopt. For example, the national poverty line in a developed state, such as
a the US, is far different from the poverty level in an under-developed, sub-Saharan
African state. Some scholars and organizations rely on global poverty lines of perhaps
$1/day per person, or $1.25 or $2. Others rely on official national poverty lines. Still
more create their own poverty measures based on measures of the cost of living or of
average income (see Brau, et al 2004; or Imai, et al 2012 for a thorough discussion of
poverty measures).
After solving how to account for the varying cost of living around the world, the
next challenge is to address the depth of poverty. Having a large population slightly
below the chosen poverty line who struggle to make ends meet, but in the end only
occasionally have to skip meals or delay seeking medical help when needed is probably
not the same as having a large population far below the same poverty line. Those far
below the poverty line will likely miss far more meals, and might never be able to seek
qualified medical assistance when needed. Poverty has at least two dimensions, breadth
and depth. Measuring either one is complicated by the tendency for poor in most
developing economies to engage heavily in the informal grey market, where transactions
are not tracked or reported. Capturing one of these dimensions precisely is difficult
enough, but capturing both is a herculean task.
An elegant solution has been suggested by respected scholars though (Girod 2011).
Rather than attempt to measure poverty based on income, I follow these innovative
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scholars and measure the direct effects of poverty. Infant mortality is directly affected by
all aspects of poverty. People living slightly below the poverty line have higher-thannormal infant mortality rates, and infant mortality rates for those who are far below the
poverty line are higher still. Moreover, infant mortality rates are much easier to track than
income based measures of poverty.
Results
The theory developed in the previous chapter suggests a relatively complex set of
results. There are three relationships that it addresses and for which it generated testable
hypotheses. The first relationship is between government and poverty, the second is
between microfinance and poverty. The third relationship is the joint relationship of
government and microfinance on poverty. Each relationship and each hypothesis is tested
and results are discussed in turn.
The Simple Effect of Government
Recall from the previous chapter that hypothesis 1 addressed the effect of
government on poverty and had several sub-hypotheses. The hypothesized relationships
are born out by the data. Table 4.3 shows the regression results. The first sub-hypothesis
is that greater economic stability decreases poverty. The Economic Stability factor is
significant and has the expected sign. That is, greater economic stability leads to lower
infant mortality. It is difficult to get a direct interpretation of the factor since the latent
variable is not directly measured, but increasing economic stability from its mean to +1
standard deviation is predicted to decrease infant mortality by 2.33.
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Economic relations have a statistically significant, though substantively very small
effect on infant mortality. Infrastructure, on the other hand, has a rather large effect.
Significant at the 0.001 level, the same standard deviation increase in the infrastructure
variable yields a predicted decrease of 9.79 deaths per thousand live births.
Table 4.3: The Effects of Institutions on Poverty

Economic Stability

Economic Relations

Infrastructure

Health expenditure, public
(% of total health
expenditure)

Ratio of female to male
primary enrollment (%)

Mortality rate,
infant (per 1,000
live births)
-2.649***
(0.758)

Effect of +1
S.D. change

-0.413*
(0.168)

-0.41

-11.54***
(0.810)

-9.79

0.0762
(0.0404)

1.03

-0.726***
(0.185)

-2.79

-2.33

Constant

94.58***
(17.63)
Observations
227
2
0.663
Adjusted R
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Educational opportunities also matter. Increasing the ratio of female to male
primary enrollment is expected to lead to a decrease of .726 in infant mortality. To put
that into context, the same standard deviation increase as has been discussed in
connection with the factor variables, is predicted to yield a decrease of 2.79 in the
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dependent variable. This makes sense, of course, since the more educated women are the
better their prospects for employment and the more information they have about anatomy
and biology, and healthy choices for themselves and their babies, the more likely they are
to be able to take care of themselves and their babies.
Finally, public health expenditures, as a portion of total health expenditures, proxies
for social welfare policies. Surprisingly, it is not quite statistically significant at the 95%
level. The relationship may be suggestive, but the substantive results are modest. The
standard deviation increase is only expected to decrease infant mortality by little more
than one.
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics II
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Economic
Stability

507

0

0.881

-2.254

1.250

Economic
Relations

392

0

0.990

-0.441

6.896

Infrastructure

405

0

0.848

-2.983

1.388

Health
Expenditure

320

54.53

13.508

23.808

90.805

Ratio of
enrollment

331

97.62

3.657

85.560

114.935

MF Assets

573

0.010

0.028

0

0.299

Number of
Borrowers

573

7.370

18

0

114.602

Out Reach

573

0.240

0.441

0

2

Foreign Aid
FDI
Polity2

420
432
323

0.050
0.030
7.501

0.098
0.041
1.958

-0.005
-0.192
-3

0.830
0.398
10
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All of this suggests strong support for Hypothesis 1, that governments with good
institutions will have less poverty than governments with poor institutions. Although the
substantive effect for sub-hypothesis B on economic relations was rather weak, and the
test on social policies was not conclusive, the results strongly supported the notion that
institutions matter and some types of institutions matter a lot. At this point it is clear that
in order to study the effect that government institutions might have on microfinance's
impact on poverty requires that the direct effect those institutions have on poverty must
also be accounted for in order to get a more accurate result.

The Simple Effect of Microfinance
Knowing that government institutions affect poverty, it is now important to
determine whether microfinance also reduces poverty, as so many scholars and
practitioners have suggested. Many scholars have suggested that microfinance reduces
poverty, even under the worst political conditions (Dowla and Barua 2006; La Torre and
Ventino 2006). If this is true it would be unique in many ways. Other common poverty
reduction techniques depend on the cooperation and smooth functioning of the recipient
government. Development aid, for example, has been found by some to help in certain
situations (Sachs 2005; Manor ed. 2007) while others argue that it never really helps
(Easterly 2006; Hubbard and Dugan 2009). The benefits of FDI for improving economic
growth and development have been well-documented (Barro 1993; Collins et al. 2009;
Dutta and Roy 2010). Hypothesis 2 is that microfinance reduces poverty, regardless of
the quality of government institutions. That is, while it might be more or less effective
under certain conditions, it will reduce poverty under all conditions.
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The empirical results show that the hypothesis is also strongly supported. The
number of borrowers remained highly significant and negatively related to infant
mortality across dozens of specifications. Table 4.5 shows the results of a baseline model
for further analysis of the microfinance-poverty relationship under different political
institutions. It is noteworthy that microfinance assets is positive and highly significant.
That is, a larger number of borrowers is negatively related to poverty, but high value
MFIs are positively related to poverty. The literature suggests that receiving a small loan
might help a struggling family a little bit today, but larger loans, or at least access to
larger loans, would be more meaningful in the long run. This does not seem to be the
case. Rather, it might be that simply having access to loans creates a degree of security
for the borrowers, allowing them the flexibility and security to take more risks that could
be financially beneficial because they know they have the loans they can fall back on for
insurance (Collins et al 2009).1 In fact, larger average loan balances might suggest a
couple of things. First, it might be that the customers are struggling financially more than
normal, and so are taking more and larger loans. In other words, it is not necessarily the
case that the loans are making them worse off, but rather, because they are worse off, they
need or want larger loans so that the relationship is reversed; poverty attracts higher value
MFIs. Second, it might also suggest that there are some customers who are ill-equipped
to manage their finances, so taking loans does leave them worse off because they use the

Average loan balance is divided by GNI per capita to control for variations across
economies, so it is not simply an issue of the variable somehow acting as a proxy for the
strength of the economy, and, therefore, development.
1
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loans unwisely, producing no growth, and then have to repay interest too, which increases
financial strain.
Table 4.5: The Effects of Microfinance on Poverty

MF Assets

Number of Borrowers

Out Reach

Foreign Aid

FDI

Mortality rate, infant
(per 1,000 live births)
137.4***
(34.26)
-0.168**
(0.0520)
2.461
(1.273)
82.11***
(8.062)
-21.32
(17.05)

Polity2

-1.092***
(0.314)

Constant

30.48***
(2.401)
Observations
304
0.346
Adjusted R2
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
This finding contradicts the findings of Roodman (2012) and many of the studies
he cites which find that microfinance has no statistically significant effect on poverty
reduction. The question is where the difference comes from. The randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) appear scientifically sound. They generally work with an MFI that is going
to offer services to a segment of the population that has not previously had access to
formal financial services, generally because of geography. Of those potential customers
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who apply for loans, they randomly assign some to a control group that receives no loans,
and others to test groups who receive loans. After a certain period of time, they ask the
customers questions about physical or financial well-being. Roodman argues that most
RCTs find no effect or, in a few cases, a slight effect, but in the wrong direction (see
Karlan and Zinman 2009 as an example).
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics III
Variable

Observatio
ns

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Private Credit

152

40.53

31.78

0

100

Public Credit

155

12.32

11.38

0

37.9

Law and Order

549

2.73

1.13

0

6

Political Risk

530

60.8

10.96

30

83

Economic Risk

549

31.37

6.43

2.5

44.5

Financial Risk

549

32.32

8.09

6

46

Composite Risk

549

62.09

11.03

26
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There are some problems with RCT research designs that are not immediately
apparent though. RCTs can only be performed in areas that have not had access to
microfinance in the past or there is risk of contamination. That is, customers who are
denied loans during the experiment may have already received loans in the past and are
doing well despite not receiving a loan through the RCT rather than because they did not
receive the RCT loan (Odell 2011). Contamination might also occur within even the most
carefully designed RCT. Collins et. al. (2009) showed that within poor communities, a
loan made to one person might benefit someone else through lending on or repayment of
previous private loans.
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For similar reasons, RCTs nearly always operate on short time frames because it is
difficult to withhold microfinance for a long time. This casts doubt on the validity of an
RCT over a longer term because it may be that it takes a while before the effects of the
loan, such as a growing micro-enterprise, are felt (Odell 2011). Meanwhile, more and
more of the control group are likely to get access to other sources of financial services.
Therefore, RCTs cannot look at aggregate effects. They look only at a specific
geographical region for a relatively brief time frame. Eliminating poverty is generally, by
all indications, a long, slow, cumbersome process that can be affected by dozens of other
variables, both cross-sectionally and over time. Only by looking at the relationships over
several years and across many instances can we create an accurate picture of the intricate
relationships involved.
Interactions Between Government and Microfinance
The next question is whether the quality of governance and institutions modifies
the effect of microfinance for the poor. Hypothesis 3 has several sub-hypotheses that
address different aspects of this question. The first states that the existence of a credit
bureau should increase the poverty reduction effect of microfinance. The argument here
is based on the availability of information. The more a MFI knows about a potential
customer, the better able they are to efficiently allocate loans and to avoid risky
borrowers. This allows them to offer loans to more prospective customers when they do
not have resourced tied up in delinquent loans.
It is also a benefit to the customers because the MFIs are able to help avoid overindebtedness. Some customers might know how much they can afford to borrow, but
many might not know what a safe debt-to-income ratio might be. Having a functioning
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credit bureau would help the MFI better serve the customers' needs. Also, having a
functioning credit bureau would allow MFI customers to court different financial service
providers. A customer might start with one MFI that offers small loans, then move on to
another institution that offers larger loans once the customer has proven herself a reliable
borrower. Some scholars argue that graduating borrowers to larger loans with more
profitable terms as income grows should be an objective of all MFIs (Ahlin and Jiang
2005). Microfinance is for the poor to relieve the pain of poverty and to help remove
them from poverty. If this is to happen, at some point they will need financial services
from other institutions, but in order to be considered for financial services, they will need
some way of proving that they are a reliable customer.
Credit bureaus can be either publicly operated or privately operated. Both public
and private credit bureaus are negatively associated with infant mortality, as shown in the
first column of Table 4.7. Regardless whether the credit bureau is public or private,
knowledge about borrowers should make the system more efficient. To test this
relationship the second and third columns on Table 4.7 include interactions between
credit bureau coverage and the number of microfinance borrowers.2 Neither interaction
term is significant, suggesting that, while credit bureaus might be helpful for commercial
lending, they do not change the poverty reduction effect of microfinance.

2

Interactions with Assets were also performed but were not significant. Since Assets
was not significant in the baseline model, that interaction is not reported. Results were
similar to those reported, though less statistically significant.
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Table 4.7: Hypothesis 3; Credit Bureaus and Law and Order
Credit
Baseline

Private *
MF

Public *
MF

Law and
Order

Law *
MF

MF Assets

128.4***
(20.07)

122.5***
(21.43)

126.3***
(22.29)

135.7***
(33.57)

136.1***
(33.65)

Number of Borrowers

-0.0701*
(0.0304)

-0.0835

-0.0657

-0.124

(0.0444)

(0.0491)

-0.147**
(0.0471)

(0.106)

-0.0626***
(0.0182)

-0.0768***
(0.00471)

-1.668**
(0.568)

-1.592*
(0.655)

Private credit bureau
coverage (% of adults)

Public credit registry
coverage (% of adults)

-0.187***
(0.0475)

-0.231***
(0.0681)
0.000201
(0.000704)

Number * Private

0.000305
(0.00217)

Number * Public

Law and Order

-0.00747
(0.0319)

Number * Law

Foreign Aid

49.13***
(11.54)

54.82***
(12.19)

66.40***
(12.31)

83.54***
(8.007)

83.90***
(8.164)

FDI

-72.45***
(15.95)

-68.09***
(16.91)

-77.88***
(17.68)

-15.05

-14.86

(16.98)

(17.02)

0.203

0.0961

-0.0944

(0.301)

(0.333)

(0.324)

-0.964**
(0.317)

-0.963**
(0.317)

23.46***
(1.989)
127
0.604

22.85***
(2.120)
127
0.553

23.42***
(2.195)
130
0.560

34.90***
(2.481)
304
0.357

34.62***
(2.743)
304
0.355

Polity2

Constant

Observations
Adjusted R2
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.8: Hypothesis 3; Political, Economic, Financial and Composite Risk

MF Assets
Number of Borrowers
Political Risk Rating

Political
Risk 1

Political
Risk 2

Economic
Risk 1

Economic
Risk 2

Financial
Risk 1

Financial
Risk 2

Composite
Risk 1

Composite
Risk 2

122.1***
(33.47)
-0.142**
(0.0471)
-0.233**
(0.0887)

141.9***
(35.69)
-0.661*
(0.334)
-0.307**
(0.100)
0.00792
(0.00505)

127.5***
(33.78)
-0.123**
(0.0470)

121.0***
(33.48)
-0.604***
(0.179)

124.9***
(33.90)
-0.124**
(0.0474)

105.1**
(34.63)
-0.583**
(0.198)

126.7***
(33.61)
-0.129**
(0.0468)

130.6***
(33.03)
-1.328***
(0.352)

-0.207
(0.144)

-0.397*
(0.158)
0.0140**
(0.00502)
-0.120
(0.140)

-0.120
(0.140)
0.0127*
(0.00531)
-0.229*
(0.109)

-0.410***
(0.119)
0.0176***
(0.00513)

Number * Political
Economic Risk Rating
Number * Economic
Financial Risk
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Number * Financial
Composite Risk
Number * Composite
Foreign Aid
FDI
Polity2
Constant

78.69***
(7.923)
-12.93
(17.15)
-0.747*
(0.352)
43.85***
(5.077)

77.53***
(7.938)
-13.61
(17.11)
-0.716*
(0.352)
48.52***
(5.875)

72.39***
(9.422)
-18.03
(17.13)
-1.137***
(0.313)
38.67***
(5.218)

74.63***
(9.351)
-16.35
(16.95)
-1.025**
(0.312)
44.18***
(5.528)

Observations
304
304
304
304
0.353
0.356
0.343
0.357
Adjusted R2
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

79.41***
(9.264)
-19.89
(17.14)
-1.199***
(0.313)
32.13***
(5.526)

83.62***
(9.359)
-18.94
(17.01)
-1.188***
(0.310)
36.01***
(5.717)

71.12***
(8.915)
-15.39
(17.15)
-0.970**
(0.327)
45.89***
(7.029)

74.77***
(8.821)
-14.45
(16.85)
-0.853**
(0.323)
57.16***
(7.643)

304
0.338

304
0.349

304
0.348

304
0.371

The fourth column of the same table shows that Law and Order affects poverty.
Where the police enforce laws and the courts punish violators, infant mortality rates are
lower. The results are robust. Stronger rule of law and more microfinance customers both
drive down infant mortality rates. However, there does not appear to be any interaction
between the two. As with credit bureaus, including the interaction term does not change
the substantive results for the individual effects, and it reveals that neither significantly
modifies the others' relationship to the outcome. Sub-hypotheses 3a and 3b are
unsupported by the data.
One of the primary assertions from chapter three was that political instability, with
all of its uncertainty and market disruption, is expected to undermine microfinance
effectiveness. The models in Table 4.8 test this assertion using four different indicators of
stability. The expected result is that microfinance will be significant and negative, as will
the measures of stability, and the interaction terms will be significant with either positive
or negative coefficients.
Political Risk, Economic Risk, Financial Risk, and Composite Risk, all purchased
from the commercially produced International Country Risk Guide are all used to
examine the key hypothesis of this study, that greater or lesser stability, at the micro-level
changes the way microfinance customers use their loans. All four measures are highly
negatively correlated with poverty. The interaction terms, which are the real tests of the
theory, are mostly significant too. Since the risk variables are index measures, and
therefore have no direct interpretation, I again rely on standard deviation increases to
compare the effects of different types of risk.
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Beginning with political risk, lower political risk, that is, higher values on the risk
rating, significantly decreases poverty. Political risk rating has the largest substantive
effect of the three individual risk ratings. A one standard deviation increase in the risk
rating, that is stability, is predicted to decrease the dependent variable by 6.512,
compared to Economic Risk Rating (5.518) and Financial Risk Rating (3.907). The
composite rating has the largest effect though, at 8.264.10 All of these are meaningful
though, and compare favorably to the results show in Table 4.7.
The interaction terms for economic risk, financial risk and composite risk are
statistically significant at the .05 level. Figures 4.1 - 4.4 show the microfinance-poverty
relationship broken down by risk levels for each type of risk. While the theory laid out in
chapter three suggested that more stable conditions should help microfinance to better
alleviate poverty, that does not appear to be the case. In fact, the reverse is true. In Figure
1, the lines are relatively flat for all levels of risk except Very High Risk, which has a
steep downward slope. In other words, under conditions of great political uncertainty and
risk, microfinance helps alleviate poverty more than in more stable conditions.
This appears to be more or less the case for economic stability too; where only very
high risk is clearly discernible from other levels of risk. It appears that only under
conditions of very high economic risk does microfinance decrease poverty. Figure 3
supports this same finding, although here it appears that high risk is also discernibly
different from the lower levels of risk. The results for composite risk as represented in

3

Based on parameter estimates for the models that include the interaction terms.
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Figure 4.1 Political Risk

Figure 4.2 Economic Risk
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Figure 4.3 Financial Risk

Figure 4.4 Composite Risk
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Figure 4 tell the story most clearly though. The highest level of risk has the strongest
negative relationship between infant mortality and the number of borrowers. The
relationship is flatter for each successive increase in the level of risk rating until, finally,
the lowest level of risk rating actually shows a clearly positive relationship between risk
and poverty.
Discussion
Tests of hypothesis 1 reinforce that there are a host of economic and policy
variables that affect poverty as measured by infant mortality. They generally have the
expected relationships. In a nut shell, more stable, better functioning states have less
poverty. In the context of the theoretical argument laid out in chapter three, wellfunctioning government and poverty tend to be significantly, negatively correlated. The
theory would suggest that the relationship is causal, that poor governance and instability
make actors more cautious and require more hedging to avoid overwhelming losses if
inflation should spike or if a primary income earner in the household should find herself
out of work.
Microfinance affects poverty too. The evidence up to this point, based on theory,
suggests that greater stability and certainty about the future allows borrowers to better
utilize microfinance. At first glance, the logical conclusion is that microfinance should be
most effective when it is unhampered by instability. The empirical evidence does not bear
this out though. Rather than finding that greater stability and lower risk allow for more
efficient use of microfinance, it seems that greater risk and instability create the
conditions under which microfinance has a detectably positive impact on poverty.
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It might be that where instability is high the composition of microfinance
customers is different. The instability causes uncertainty and the uncertainty makes
borrowing too risky for the very poor because, although the loan might still be successful,
the greater margin of error, and consequently, the lower expectation of success deters
those who would be risking the most. The nature of microfinance is that MFIs must
streamline the lending process in order to be self-sustaining and avoid charging
inaccessibly high rates and fees. This means that loans are offered in predetermined sizes,
without discriminating based on income or assets. In other words, the very poor and the
not-so-poor get the same size loans. The not-so-poor could see the loan fail and perhaps
still recover while the very poor might be borrowing too much to be able to recover from
if the loan fails. So when instability is high, the very poor are less likely to borrow from
MFIs and the not-so-poor might be more likely to borrow from MFIs because the loans
are smaller than those likely to be offered by traditional commercial lenders. This could
be important because, the not-so-poor are more likely to have the skills that will allow
them to make better use of the loans (Getubig et al 2000). Having those skills might
allow them to get or keep the virtuous circle moving forward (Remenyi 2000; Easterly
2001).
It might also be that for most microfinance investments an investor cannot be
sufficiently confident of a positive outcome to make an investment under instability, but
the most profitable investments might still balance out the risk involved. This works on
the same principle as the person who only buys a lottery ticket when the jackpot climbs
above $200 million. The investor knows that it is risky, but the possible reward is
tempting enough to take the chance.
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The difference is that when playing the lottery the investor knows her probability of
success. The only uncertainty is how many other winners she might have to split the
winnings with. Microfinance under political instability has a good deal more uncertainty.
The investor might not know the answer to simple questions like whether the local
market will be open when she is ready to sell her product or to larger questions like
whether the police will confiscate her goods, whether she will have to flee violence or
whether the government itself will be functioning in the future.

Politically Stable
Uncertainty

Risk

Range of minimum
acceptable payoff

Politically Unstable
Uncertainty

R2

R1

Range of minimum
acceptable payoffs

Figure 4.5 Stability and Risk

From the investor's perspective uncertainty effectively transforms risk in the riskreward balance from a point to a range. The investor has to assume that risk – specifically
the risk of, or the probability of, failure – might be anywhere in that range and will only
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invest if she thinks the potential payoff is large enough to balance risk if risk is at the
high end of uncertainty. It is possible that risk has increased along with political
instability and uncertainty although it is not necessarily so. Risk might remain the same
while only uncertainty increases. Uncertainty, then, obscures the true risk. The investor,
by definition, cannot know where in the range of uncertainty the risk point lies. The result
is that microfinance customers in an unstable regime are actually likely to make more
beneficial, although fewer, investments than under a politically stable regime. The MFI is
unable to know the payoff for any given investment, so it falls to the borrower to
determine whether the payoff outweighs the risk and uncertainty. When it does, she will
take the loan. Fewer people, then, should be taking loans under political instability, but
those that do should see just as high a rate of success and the success should be greater
because this selection mechanism favors the most profitable investments. The effect on
poverty is that fewer people will benefit, but their rewards will be greater.
A third possible explanation for the results is that borrowers rely on microfinance
as an informal insurance mechanism. They use loans to fill troughs in the income and
repay loans at peak income levels. Where income is most uncertain, that is, under
conditions of high political or economic risk, households desperately need help
smoothing their income distribution. Microfinance fills that gap, and in so doing
dramatically improves the quality of life for the savvy MFI customers. Finally, it is also
possible, of course, that more than one of these effects is at play simultaneously.
Conclusion
This chapter tested, and found evidence for, the hypothesis that the quality and
effectiveness of political institutions affect poverty directly, as well as the relationship
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between microfinance and poverty. Both were found to be rather robust. The primary
contribution of this project, though, is examining how governance affects the relationship
between microfinance and poverty reduction. The results did not support the theoretical
expectation that greater stability would lead to a stronger downward effect of
microfinance on poverty. Instead, it seems to be under conditions of instability where
microfinance has the strongest negative effect on poverty.
This finding might be explained as an artifact of potential borrowers' risk
assessment under uncertainty. Unfortunately, however, the data is not fine grained enough
to tease out those effects. Testing the explanations proposed above will likely require
studying the phenomenon at the individual level. In the next chapter I will examine these
relationships in the Brazilian context.
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CHAPTER 5
Microfinance In Brazil: A Case Study

Results from the previous chapter indicated that microfinance most effectively
reduces poverty under conditions of uncertainty about the future; that is, where risk for
political, economic or financial instability is high. The theory described in chapter three
suggested that because risk increases uncertainty about the future, potential clients should
be wary of undertaking ventures, such as microloans, when risk is high because it could
lead to financial problems down the road when loan payments are due. If a potential
client does not pursue a microloan because risk is high and the future is uncertain, she
might be avoiding possible future financial ruin, but she cannot improve her quality of
life through microfinance either. Therefore, the finding that microfinance has the largest
impact on poverty under conditions of high risk was unexpected.
This chapter will examine these relationships at a different level. Where chapter
four approached the topic from a large N statistical perspective, studying all of Latin
America over approximately 20 years, this chapter focuses on a single case. The case to
be studied here is Brazil. Brazil was selected in large part because its political climate has
undergone considerable changes over the past few decades, and economic and financial
risk factors have varied along with the political changes. This provides useful data for
scrutiny and analysis. Brazil is an interesting case to study because its risk factors vary
widely over time as well as geography. Brazil’s industrial and economic development has
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been a tumultuous process. In the most recent phase of this process, during most of the
1990's and the first few years of the 2000's, Brazil was given relatively high risk scores
across the board. During the middle of that decade scores improved significantly, only to
drop again before recovering towards the end of the decade.
Also, as a federal state there are sub-units within Brazil that can be studied
independently, thus allowing for a deeper analysis. Geographically Brazil developed very
unevenly. Consequently it is often broken into five regions; the Northeast, the poorest and
generally most unstable; followed by the North and Centralwest; and the Southeast and
South have been the industrial and financial center of the country for generations, with
relatively robust economies and low poverty rates. This makes for useful comparisons
between the different regions of Brazil.
Where chapter four studied all three hypotheses derived from the theory in chapter
three, this chapter will focus on the third hypothesis which deals with the three risk
factors and their effects on poverty reduction through microfinance. As in the previous
chapter, I assume that instability and risk for future instability are good indicators of the
quality of governmental institutions since good institutions should be able to minimize
risk.
Hypothesis 3: The higher the quality of governmental institutions, the greater the poverty
reduction effect of microfinance.

A Brief History of Recent Political Changes in Brazil
Although Brazilian history extends back to the 16th century, from the time that the
aristocracy lost control of the leadership in Brazil, the country experienced cycles of
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tremendous economic growth and periods of severe mismanagement. Getúlio Vargas
became the country’s provisional president in 1930. Before that time Brazil had been
primarily an agricultural economy, exporting tropical and sub-tropical products, primarily
to the North-Atlantic states (Skidmore 1967). Some of these products include rubber,
coffee, tobacco, cocoa, cotton and tropical fruits. Coffee was a uniquely important cash
crop that the federal government depended on for tax revenue. The trouble was that the
world market price of coffee began to decline considerably around Vargas’ time. Vargas
continued the policies of his predecessors, trying to manipulate the world coffee market
in order to maintain higher prices for coffee. The government regularly purchased large
quantities of coffee to withhold from the market, assuming that global demand was
relatively inelastic (Baer 2001). Where this strategy had only been moderately successful
before 1930, it seems to have been more successful during the depression years. The
result was a current account surplus for Brazil during the mid to late 1930s.
Although Vargas was a proud Gaucho from the southern state of Rio Grande do
Sul, as interim president, and then dictator after 1937, he was concerned with making all
of Brazil more productive and stable (Skidmore 1967). He was the first president to travel
to many of the rural regions of the North and Centralwest plains, and the first to show any
real interest in the North-east since the demand for Brazilian sugar had all but died nearly
a century before. Vargas encouraged increased agricultural productivity, but he also
advocated for industrialization. With the current account surplus largely from coffee
receipts from the mid-1930s Brazil began to buy industrial technology and equipment
(Baer 2001). Vargas also courted FDI, which helped industrialize the country as investors
brought in new technology, equipment and best practices (Amann 2003; Levine 1998).
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Celso Furtado, perhaps Brazil’s most recognized and distinguished economist, said that
this period, beginning in 1930, is when the industrial system was implanted in Brazil
(Dulles 1967).
Another of Vargas’ legacies was his attention to the plight of the poor. He created
a meritocratic hiring process for the civil service in which anybody and everybody could
take civil service exams (Levine 1998). Hiring was based on qualifications, regardless of
race. Vargas did not go out of his way to hire people of color, but neither did he
discriminate against them which they saw as a welcome change. This meant that an entire
cohort of the population had opportunities opened to them that had never been available
before. Vargas also instituted a minimum wage and mandatory benefits for salaried
workers (Dulles 1967; Skidmore 1967). He organized Sindicatos, or officially recognized
unions to represent workers (Levine 1998; Skidmore 1967).
Vargas’ close relationship to US President Roosevelt during the war years meant
that Brazil cooperated fairly extensively with the United States. Roosevelt sent US Army
maintenance personnel to improve airports and construct buildings and roads all over
Brazil (Levine 1998). Brazil increased production of iron ore, rubber and other raw
materials for the Allied war effort. Steel mills and chemical plants were built and rail
lines and other infrastructure were improved so Brazil could begin producing steel,
petrochemicals and fertilizer for the Allies as well (Novelli and Galvão 2001). Brazil
grew its industrial sector with export profits and through state investments.This
represents the first period of import substitution industrialization (ISI).
However, because of the massive US spending in Brazil, and her exports to other
Allied states, Brazil got its first taste of inflation, which would become a recurring
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problem in the Brazilian economy for the following 50 years (Baer 2001). Vargas
adjusted the minimum wage to account for inflation and authorized congress to punish
speculators in food stuff in order to keep prices on essential goods in check (Dulles
1967). These policies were moderately effective, preventing inflation from leaving the
poor in complete destitution, but were unable to reduce inflation to levels that would be
conducive to real growth. By the end of the war Brazil had several state of the art steel
mills, paper mills, petrochemical plants, and had discovered oil. Nonetheless, the
authoritarian Vargas was pushed out of office and a new democratic regime was created.
The first post-war election brought in General Dutra. Politically, Dutra was rather
bland. Economically he began by liberalizing the economy, removing trade barriers and
liberalizing exchange rates. The result was that by 1947 Brazil had virtually exhausted its
foreign exchange reserves and gone from huge current account surpluses to major current
account deficits (Skidmore 1967). He subsequently reintroduced exchange controls and
spent the rest of his term in office addressing short-term issues. Regardless of his
apparently stumbling policies, Brazil continued to industrialize through the late 1940s
until Vargas returned to the capital in Rio de Janeiro as the democratically elected
president in 1950.
Vargas and his successors continued many of the same economic policies as
before, courting FDI to promote industrialization. ISI continued, often helped along by
foreign exchange controls, which shifted over time in response to waves of inflation,
exhausted foreign reserves, and government budgetary deficits (Skidmore 1967).
Although industrialization moved forward, urbanization, inflation and growing
inequality together countered many of the benefits of industrialization for the working
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poor (Baer 2001). Prices on basic consumer goods, like food and housing outstripped
wage growth so that real wages declined. The national poverty rate in 1970 reached 68%,
one of the highest ever recorded by Brazil’s Instituto de Pesquisa e Economia Aplicada
(IPEA).
In 1964 the military took control of the state once again, riding a wave of support
in large part due to the economic pressure many Brazilians were facing and their
dissatisfaction with the democratic regime. The military regime quickly moved to try and
improve the economy since it was the risk of working class militancy that gave
legitimacy to the 1964 coup (Meade 2003). General Emilio Medici launched what has
often been called the “Brazilian Miracle”. The regime made a renewed effort to court
foreign investment in order to boost manufacturing and to build infrastructure. Brazil also
opened its borders to trade in a way it never had before (Baer 2001). The result was that
GDP more than tripled from 1965-1980 (Frieden 1987). Steel production and automobile
manufacturing increased by factors of 3 and 5 respectively (Meade 2003). The true
“Miracle Years” were 1968-1973 during which the economy saw double digit growth and
inflation held below 20% (Moreira Alves 1985). Most of the miracle was in the industrial
sector, but tax deductions for capital gains also spurred the stock market as well. Foreign
investments grew from $11.4 million in 1968 to $4.5 billion by 1973.
The problem was that all of these gains were made on the back of foreign
investment. Initially the economy was able to export enough to service debt obligations,
but as debt continued to increase, and more and more Brazilians moved to the cities to
look for work, combined with the oil crises of the 1970’s, the system’s weak foundation
quickly began to fracture. Between 1980 and 1983 GDP per capita fell by 15% and the
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capital goods industry finished out 1983 at 60% of what it had been just three years
earlier (Frieden 1987). Needless to say, many Brazilians suffered when the “Brazilian
Miracle” turned into the Brazilian nightmare.This was also a period of tremendous
inequality with the wealthy capturing most of the profits from growth and the poor
uninsulated against the downward slide of the economy (Baer 2001). Inequality persisted
despite the ups and downs of the economy (Amann 2003).
Reported poverty rates improved considerably from 1970-1980, although it was
still rather high in 1980 at nearly 40%. Also, some of the improvement was the result of
the miracle growth years, but some of it was the result of under-reporting poverty
(Moreira Alves 1985). In 1975 an estimated 25 million children were living without the
most basic needs, and 68% of children in one study reported working more than 40
hours/week to supplement the family’s income (Moreira Alves 1985).Hunger became a
serious concern for many Brazilians. The World Bank commissioned a report on hunger
and undernourishment in Brazil which concluded was the cause of 40% of infant
mortality, which was at an astonishingly high 87.3/1000 live births. The same report
found that 79.5% of Northeasterners consumed less than the UN established minimum
caloric intake for human development, as well as 87.4% of people in Northern states, and
even 57.9% in Southeastern and Southern states. Despite an increase in minimum salaries
in 1983, a minimum salary was not enough to pay for the basic caloric needs of an adult
man, much less housing, clothes, transportation, or the needs of an entire family. Much of
the pain the poor were facing during this time was the result of inflation and government
over-indebtedness (Baer 2001; Bresser-Pereira 2002).
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In 1985 a popular movement forced the military rule out to make way for a new
democratic regime. A series of unfortunate events prevented potentially successful
leaders from making meaningful changes for nearly another decade. President elect,
Tancredo Neves, who many people thought was capable of turning the economy around,
died before taking office. Consequently, his vice president, José Sarney who was not
nearly as popular or prepared to fill the role, was made president (Amann 2003; Roett
2010). Brazil suffered from rampant inflation, a stagnating economy, and lingering
human rights abuses being perpetrated by government actors, even after the democratic
transition (Meade 2003). Government debt approached 55% of GDP in 1988, one of the
highest debt to GDP ratios in the world at that time (Martone 2003). The economy was
also racked with inflation which worsened over time. The military government grew the
economy via a massive influx of borrowed capital, but when debt obligations began to
outstrip the government’s ability to raise revenue the economy went into a tail spin of
ever increasing inflation as the state printed cash to try and cover its debt. In the 1970's
inflation was around 74%, which grew to 428% in the '80s, and reached 1400% from
1990-1994 (Gordon 2001, 3). Inflation, of course, eroded real wages which quickly drove
the prices of key commodities, especially food, out of reach for many Brazilian
households (Bresser-Pereira 2009). The price index change topped out at 1061.5% in
1988 (Amann 2003).
In response to the economic problems that were tearing the country apart, the new
democratic government developed and rolled out the Cruzado Plan. The plan created a
new currency, the Cruzado, which replaced the old Cruzeiro. The plan also froze prices,
wages, rents and mortgage payments and guaranteed wage increases along with the
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consumer price index in order to control inflation. Conditions improved for the average
Brazilian rather quickly. With higher wages and lower prices on everyday commodities,
Brazilians were happy. The price freeze was critical to making the plan work, but also
guaranteed that the plan would eventually fail because it also led to over-consumption,
near zero investment, massive capital flight and wide ranging skepticism among many
investors and economists (Roett 2010). The Cruzado Plan was announced in February of
1986 but by the time elections were over in November of the same year, the problems the
plan had created were quite prominent (Bresser-Pereira 2009). The government almost
immediately announced a new plan before the end of the year, with the clever name
Cruzado II.
The Cruzado II realigned prices on middle-class consumer goods and increased
taxes on those goods. The objective was to reduce consumption and encourage saving
and investment. The outcome, however, was to simply divert expenditures to substitute
goods. Inflation ensued shortly thereafter. By February 1987 the Central Bank of Brazil
announced a moratorium on existing debt obligations because its reserves had been
depleted (Gordon 2001). This, of course, killed any investor confidence that might have
remained up to that point. Brazil’s private capital account hit an all-time low with a
deficit of about $10 billion in 1989 (Goldfajn and Minella 2007).
The next set of policies was the Bresser Plan, which failed almost from the
beginning. With inflation at 81% per month by March of 1990, and GDP growth barely
over 1%, something needed to be done. The Bresser Plan adopted new price and wage
caps and removed the mechanism that forced wage increases. Due in part to fiscal
irresponsibility, and in part to the new constitution of 1988 which transferred a great deal
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of power and resources from the federal government to the states, the Bresser Plan went
the way of its predecessors (Roett 2010). As did the subsequent plan, the Cruzado Novo
(or New Cruzado), which was a cheap copy of the previous plans but with new price and
wage caps and another new currency, the Cruzeiro; the fourth currency in four years and
the eighth since 1940 (Novelli and Galvão 2001; Rohter 2010). By this time the Brazilian
public was so frustrated and angry with Brasilia that President Sarney rarely left the
capital, and relied on a military escort to ensure his personal safety at all times (Roett
2010). Those who supported the democratic transition of 1985 must have begun to
reconsider (Lincoln 2001). Those who had supported the transition were having their legs
cut out from under them by the abysmal economic performance. The economy under the
military regime, as bad as it had been, was still better than what the democratically
elected government had produced in nearly five years. The national poverty rate in 1990
was still well over 40%, with no relief in sight.
Fernando Collor de Mello was the first directly elected president of the new
regime. He initiated a broad liberalization program which set the stage for later
developments. He created the Collor plan, which confiscated savings and investments to
try and stabilize the economy. The plan was unsuccessful and he was impeached in 1992
for corruption (Kinzo and Dunkerly 2003). Mello’s vice president, Itamar Franco, took
over until the next election in 1994. Franco appointed Fernando Cardoso as Finance
Minister who then introduced the Plano Real. This plan included another new currency,
but also liberalized the economy and weakened state monopolies. Economic growth
ensued, though income equality and poverty reduction did not immediately follow
(Bresser-Pereira 2002; Rohter 2010).
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Cardoso declared the “end of the Vargas Era” in 1994, indicating the Brazil was
following sound and sustainable liberal economic principles and abandoning ISI (Novelli
and Galvão 2001). As president from 1994-2002 Cardoso was able to get the country
through several trying years, which included abandoning a key part of the Real Plan, the
currency peg, as well as an IMF package to underpin the Real. Improvements in the
economy initially benefited the wealthy, but the poorer classes continued to suffer greatly
during this time from the lingering effects of decades of economic turmoil (Baer 2001).
So although the economy was beginning to look healthier from the macro perspective,
with consistent positive growth, improving trade relationships, acceptable levels of
inflation and so on, a large portion of the population was still very dissatisfied. The Plano
Real, however, is really what put Brazil on track to later be included with Russia, India
and China when Jim O’Neill coined the term BRICs for the four middle-income countries
that have the capability of dramatically changing the global economy in the coming
decades (O’Neill 2012; Rohter 2010). Finally, with the economy stabilizing in the late
90s, Cardoso initiated programs that were designed to directly address the needs of the
poor, such as the bolsa escolar; he simply did not have enough time to get them off the
ground before the 2002 election cycle.
From the 1960s up to this point real interest rates had been very high, often
upwards of 25%, and at times as high as 65% (Segura-Ubiergo 2012). These high interest
rates were almost certainly a result of the inflation that plagued Brazil over the decades.
When inflation is high interest rates must also be high in order to stay ahead of inflation.
If not, creditors lose money every time they lend. Consequently, it was rather costly to
borrow money. Large enterprises, such as those created and grown through ISI policies,
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were often able to borrow internationally at much lower rates, but small and medium
enterprises, as well as households, generally did not have that option. The steep price of
credit put it out of reach for most microentrepreneurs and households. So when
microfinance was introduced it met a tremendous, long-standing, unfulfilled demand for
credit that was accessible for small actors (Chaves 2011; Mezzera 2002).
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or just Lula, campaigned explicitly against the neoliberal policies that Cardoso had enacted (Rohter 2010). He even went so far as to say
that as president he would not pay Brazil's foreign debts until the Brazilian people were
taken care of.1 His rhetoric made investors and creditors very nervous during the run up
to the 2002 election cycle, but because so many Brazilians had been suffering
economically for so long Lula won solidly. In the final weeks of the campaign, however,
Lula alienated some of the fringe of his party in order to move more towards the center
on economic policy. Once in office his fiscal policies were so conservative, especially
compared to his campaign rhetoric, that many began calling it Cardoso's third term (Roett
2010).
Lula did begin some of his promised reforms right away though. For example, the
Bolsa Escola which was already in place in 2003 merged with the Bolsa Família to help
over 11 million Brazilians by 2009 (Soares, Ribas and Osório 2010). The economy
settled down to a steadier growth rate, inflation was within an acceptable range of about
3-8% and investment was flowing into Brazil. By 2008 Brazil was given investment
grade status on its foreign debt, one of only 14 sovereign states worldwide to receive such

1

Lula did not actually follow through with this threat.
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a high rating (Roett 2010). In 2010 Brazil had the fourth largest stock market in the world
and three of the 10 largest banks in the world, in terms of market capitalization. It also
had a booming energy sector, and was growing its industrial and agricultural production.
Microfinance in Brazil
While all of this was occurring, microfinance efforts spread throughout Brazil.
There were programs to make small loans to microentrepreneurs as early as 1973 though
the programs were relatively small and isolated (Lopez and Macedo 2010; Meagher et al
2006). The long history of poverty and inequality for many Brazilians almost certainly
made them eager to embrace anything that would help them break out of that cycle.
Commercial microfinance made its way to Brazil during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
By the late 1990s microfinance was expanding rather quickly to offer many different
products and services to millions of Brazilians (Mandelli 2012; Schonberger 2001).
Households’ ability to break loose from the shackles of poverty, however, was influenced
by turbulence in government bureaucracy and economic policies, as described in the
following pages.
An important element of the economic growth model during the late 1990s and
early 2000s was the result of a need to attract foreign financing to cover Brazil’s external
payment imbalances (Medialdea 2013). The government raised interest rates to deter
domestic borrowing and attract foreign investment. While this strategy had the intended
effect, the unintended effects were that many Brazilians found it nearly impossible to
access credit. Only 10% of small and medium enterprises were able to obtain the bank
loans they applied for in 1999 (Medialdea 2013, 431). This then led to decreased
consumption, salaries and employment.
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Many experts expected microfinance to play a major role in Brazil because it
seemed that all of the conditions were right for the microfinance industry to flourish;
from a growing economy, to high inequality, a liberalizing market, and a commercialized
banking sector (Chaves 2011; Nichter et al 2002; Schonberger 2001; Vanroose 2010). In
fact, microfinance grew very quickly for a few years after the MFI CrediAmigo was
established in 1997. By the end of its first full year it had as many customers as all other
MFIs in Brazil combined and by 2001 it had reached more than 85,000 active borrowers
(Meagher et al 2006). CrediAmigo served the North East of Brazil, where poverty was
especially high. In fact, while the national poverty rate in 1999 was just over 35%, the
poverty rate in the Northeast was generally over 60% with Piauí the highest at over 66%.
Figure 1 shows that the effect of microfinance is difficult to discern in Brazil. This
is likely because so few Brazilians are able to actually take advantage of microfinancial
services (Chaves 2011; Vanroose 2010). Even in the states with the highest
concentrations of microfinance borrowers, only about 0.8% of the population is taking
advantage of microfinance at any given time. Often it is far less than that. So, while
microfinance might have a significant impact on borrowers, it has a limited impact at the
national scale. Consequently, there is no obvious relationship between the number of
microfinance borrowers in Brazil and infant mortality rates over time. This is also
because infant mortality is affected by a number of factors that have nothing to do with
microfinance, such as advancements in technology and medical expertise. Nor is it
immediately apparent that microfinance reduces poverty rates, for many of the same
reasons. Looking at the national level of risk in Figure 2 does not help either. It would be
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difficult to convince anybody, based on this evidence, either that microfinance matters or
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Constraints on credit, taken together with the high poverty rate in the Northeast
and the political and economic turmoil causing uncertainty in the system seem like the
perfect conditions for microfinance to do its work. The national poverty rate remained
nearly stagnant, fluctuating between 33.9% in 1997 and 35.79% in 2003. The poverty rate
for much of the country increased during this time though, likely as a result of the credit
crunch, frozen wages and high unemployment (Medialdea 2013). Most states in the
Southeast and South saw stagnant or mildly increased poverty rates over this time. No
other state in the South or Southeast saw poverty increase as much as São Paulo did
though, rising from about 16% to 21.6%, although several of the Northern states saw s
imilar increases in the poverty rate. Roraima, for example, a relatively small state
sandwiched in between Amazonas state, Venezuela and Guyana, saw poverty rates
increase from just less than 27% in 1997 to about 48% in 2002. In the Northeast,
however, where CrediAmigo served more than 80,000 customers, poverty rates neither
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stagnated nor increased. The poverty rate in Piauí dropped from 70.1% in 1997 to 61.8%
in 2003 for a total reduction of 12%, and in Maranhão it dropped from 72.5% to 65.9%, a
total reduction of about 9%.

From the “Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute” (IBGE)
Figure 5.4 Regions of Brazil

For additional context, consider Table 5.1 below. The level of microfinance varied
considerably across regions. In the Southeast, for example, there were only 1577 total
reported microfinance borrowers in 2003 which meant that there were about .02
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borrowers per thousand residents.2 The Northeast had around 345,000 borrowers for a
rate of about 7 borrowers per thousand residents. The south was somewhere in between
with just less than one borrower per thousand residents.3
Table 5.1: Changes in the number of Borrowers by Region
2003

North
Northeast
South
Southeast

Borrowers

Population

345,274
21,818
1,577

13,504,599
48,845,112
25,734,253
74,447,456

Microfinance/
1000 pop
7.069
0.848
0.021

2009

North
Northeast
South
Southeast

Borrowers

Population

159
460,839
129,042
94,955

15,142,684
53,088,499
27,497,970
80,187,717

Microfinance/
1000 pop
0.011
8.681
4.693
1.184

% Growth
-33.5
491.4
5021.2

% Growth in
MF/pop
-22.8
453.5
4590.2

Within a few years, however, regulations changed which may have slowed the
growth of microfinance. In 2002 the Cardoso administration passed usury laws that
limited interest rates on loans to the poor, capping most loans at 2% (Helms and Reille

Microfinance information was not recorded at the state level in Brazil until the
government agency PNMPO began tracking it in 2007. This microfinance data comes
from theMIX.org which collects information at the MFI level, not the state level. This
makes it impossible to determine precisely how much microfinance there is in each state
because many MFIs serve more than one state. Dividing microfinance by region is more
manageable though.
3
There are some MFIs that serve multiple regions. Those were excluded from these
calculations since it is impossible to know how it was divided among the regions. Since
the point of the discussion is to compare across regions and those that operate interregionally do not consistently offer more services in one region than another, I do not
believe that this biases the results.
2
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2004). The law was intended to protect the poor from predatory lending practices, but in
an industry where 70% APR interest rates are often necessary just to cover costs, the 2%
cap likely discouraged many private investors from entering the market (Armendariz de
Aghion and Morduch 2005; Kumar 2005). The legislation package included provisions
intended to loosen credit for microfinance, but it also discouraged new microcredit
lending, especially privately funded lending. The problem became so pronounced that at
one point roughly 50% of banks were shirking the legislative requirement to set aside
funds for microfinance, opting instead to hold the money in zero interest accounts rather
than put the money at risk of default for very modest profits (Meagher et al 2006).
Although the usury legislation was intended to protect the poor, it acted as a market
bruising regulation (Helms and Reille 2004). Although microfinance continued to grow
over the following years, without these regulations there would likely have been more of
a private investor presence in the market and, therefore, more MFIs lending to more
customers, with additional funds (Chaves 2011; Nichter, Goldmark and Fiori 2002; Olsen
2010). Today there are more than 60 MFIs in Brazil, but most of them are funded through
government institutions or NGOs.
Government involvement in microfinance may have further stunted the industry
when the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento (National Development Bank), which was
supposed to disburse funds to approved MFIs according to a piece of 2003 legislation,
failed to do so on time. The belated funds caused slow-downs in service among the MFIs
(Meagher et al 2006). This meant that clients did not receive the loans they needed when
they expected them. This seemed to reduce loan renewals and, apparently, incentives to
repay loans. The difficulties this presented to MFIs were exacerbated by years of
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constantly changing regulations (Chaves 2011). Moreover, most MFIs in Brazil are
severely limited in the types of services they are legally allowed to provide to their
customers. Except for government operated MFIs, they can only provide credit (Helms
and Reille 2004). This prevents them from being able to take advantage of some of the
innovations that MFIs in other countries use, like tying loans to forced savings accounts,
or offering insurance options along with, or even instead of loans.
This same period is also a focal point because Brazil saw a change in risk trends.
Recall from Figure 2 above that the environment in Brazil was growing riskier from
about 1997 until 2003. After 2004 risk began receding. This is in part due to fluctuations
in the value of the Real during the first time period, bouncing from less than $R1/dollar
to well over $R3.5/dollar from 1996 to 2003. From early 2004 the Real appreciated until
in 2008, just before the global recession hit Brazil, the exchange rate was nearly
$R1.5/dollar again. For Brazilian businesses the 2004-2008 time period was a good one;
much better than the 1997-2003 time period. For the poor in the less stable states,
however, that is not the case. So microfinance was held back and risk decreased after
2003.
While poverty generally decreased more quickly in the Northeastern states than
for most other states during 1997-2003 (T1), the reverse is true for 2004-2009 (T2).
During T1 recall that São Paulo saw poverty increase by 34%, but it was nearly cut in
half during T2 from 20.58% to 11.01%. Paraná, another southern state, saw poverty
decrease from 22.7% to 12.37% for a total reduction of 46% during T2 compared to a
mere 14% reduction during T1. The Northeastern states also saw a jump in poverty
reduction during T2. In Piauí poverty decreased by 12% during T1 and by 36% during
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T2. For Maranhão the T1 reduction was 9% and T2 reduction was 35%. The differences
in the rate of change from T1 to T2 for most of Brazil are rather dramatic. In São Paulo
the rate of reduction swung wildly from a 30% increase to a 50% decrease. In Paraná the
swing was 32%, much closer to the national average. In the Northeastern states the
changes were more modest. In Piauí the swing was only 24% and 25% in Maranhão.

It is important to look at differences in the growth of microfinance across these
regions too. Microfinance increased in every region, but it did not increase evenly across
regions. From 2003 to 2008 microfinance grew by only 23% in the Northeast, a rather
modest increase considering the growth over the previous five years from nearly zero to
more than 345,000 borrowers. In the South it grew by about 450% and in the Southeast it
grew by around 4600%.
To understand the meaning of these changes in poverty we must keep in mind that
there are many causes that affect poverty and microfinance is just one of them. Lula’s
Bolsa Familia program began to function effectively around the beginning of T2, which
almost certainly contributed significantly to national poverty reduction. The economy
was stronger and more stable, so businesses grew. Official unemployment shrank from
over 12% to under 8%. Wages, instead of shrinking, began to grow again. GDP per capita
PPP (purchasing power parity) grew from less than $8,000 at the beginning of 2004 to
more than $9,500 in 2009. There were a lot of reasons for poverty to decrease during T2,
but the fact that it decreased for the Northeastern states during the economically painful
and tumultuous years of T1 and stagnated for the rest of the country is interesting because
microfinance was also quite robust in the Northeast during that time. Combined with the
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observation that the rest of the country saw much larger shifts in the rate of reduction
during T2 while the Northeast saw only modest reductions in poverty, very modest
increases in microfinance, and much smaller shifts from T1 to T2 is suggestive that
microfinance played an important role in Brazil at least from 1997-2003, and possibly
thereafter as well. These observations parallel the conclusions from chapter four.
Rational Peasants in Brazil
The beginning of this chapter started by discussing the findings of the previous
chapter and pointing out that because risk increases uncertainty about the future, potential
clients should be wary of undertaking ventures, such as microloans, when risk is high
because it could lead to financial problems down the road when loan payments are due. If
a potential client does not pursue a microloan because risk is high and the future is
uncertain, she might be avoiding possible future financial ruin, but she cannot improve
her quality of life through microfinance either. Therefore, the finding that microfinance
has the largest impact on poverty under conditions of high risk might catch some by
surprise.
On the other hand, scholars such as Samuel Popkin would not be surprised by this
result. Popkin’s Rational Peasant argument (1980) is that peasants continually make
efforts to improve their quality of life through long and short term public and private
investments (Popkins 1980, 413). This clearly fits well with microfinance since it
provides peasants the opportunity to pursue short and medium term private investments.
Many peasants might not be able to secure themselves against risk of severely damaging
loss when uncertainty is high, but if some can, and they foresee the possibility of
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“measurably improving their position”, they are likely to accept the risk (Popkins 1980,
425).
The Brazilian constitution of 1988 strengthened local governments, giving them
more autonomy and resources in order to make decisions based on the needs of their own
people. Most of these states existed before 1988, though not all of them, and there was
considerable variation between them in terms of the nature and health of the economy,
bureaucracy and level of human development. The new constitution gave states the power
to develop unique approaches based on their individual situations.
Although each state has the autonomy to develop unique policies, and they often
do, there are similarities within each region. The Brazilian news outlet Veja recently
released a series of info-graphics that illustrate the disparities across the country. Each
region is given a score from 0-100, where 100 represents the best possible environment,
based on data from the Economist Intelligence Unit. For the productivity of labor the
Southeast scored 81.3 while the Northeast scored 19.4. For the number of university
graduates per capita, the Southeast scored 87.5, while the Northeast scored 36.1 and the
North 10.7. When it comes to corruption, the South scored 50 while the Northeast scored
only 25, the North only 21.4 and the Centralwest only 18.8. Turning to demographics,
São Paulo alone accounted for more than 40% of GNP and more than 25% of national
population in 1995 (Selcher 1998). The poverty rates in 2010 range from a high of
60.45% in Alagoas, a Northeastern state, to a low of 10.5 in Santa Catarina, a Southern
state (IBGE). Although there are some regions in the North with very high poverty rates,
the Northeast generally gets the most attention in discussions of poverty reduction for
two reasons. First, the Northeast has consistently high poverty across the region and has
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Table 5.2: Microfinance Loans, Population and Loan Value

State
Northeast
Alagoas
Bahia
Ceará
Maranhao
Paraíba
Pernambuco
Piauí
Rio Grande do
Norte
Sergipé

Avg
Loan
Size

Cost of
Living

Loan
Size/
Cost of
Living

1223.94
1993.93
1431.96
1466.96
1725.14
1777.54
1619.73

1.005
0.720
0.891
1.110
0.736
0.712
0.724

1680.96

0.774

1809.83

0.688

Value of
Loans

Populatio
n x 1000

Loan
Value/
capita

3.10E+07
6.90E+07
1.40E+08
1.10E+08
4.80E+07
5.40E+07
6.90E+07

3,169
14,021
8,448
6,570
3,767
8,796
3,119

9.7825
4.9210
16.5719
16.7436
12.7428
6.1391
22.1224

1230.35
1435.91
1275.73
1628.95
1269.84
1265.79
1172.53

3.40E+07
3.00E+07

3,168
2,068

10.7319
14.5066

1301.44
1244.76

6.20E+06
3.80E+07
3.20E+06

10,696
6,250
10,440

0.5797
6.0803
0.3065

2447.69
3964.94
4900.46

2962.4

0.826

3509.58
2818.42

1.130
1.739

1.50E+06
2.60E+07
4.60E+06
5.40E+06

3,512
19,595
15,994
41,252

0.4271
1.3268
0.2876
0.1309

1556.02
1496.23
3330.92
2666.67

2569.92
2596.65
3386.78
3337

0.605
0.576
0.984
0.799

3.00E+06
2.00E+06

6,004
3,034

0.4997
0.6592

3115.26
2155.17

2428.04
1908.74

1.283
1.129

1.10E+06

2,449

0.4491

6214.69

2459.46

2.527

577105
5.70E+06
~
~
~
~
~

1,561
7,588
734
670
3,484
450
1,383

0.3698
0.7512

6484.33
1451.12

2344.82
2011.31
1973.21
2544.64
1791.6
1596.51
1966.8

2.765
0.721

South
Rio Grande do
Sul
Santa Catarina
Paraná

Southeast
Esperito Santo
Minas Gerais
Rio de Janeiro
São Paulo

Centralwest
Goiás
Mato Grosso
Mato Grosso
do Sul

North
Rondônia
Pará
Acre
Amapá
Amazonas
Roraima
Tocantins

~ Microfinance data not available
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had since the Brazilian sugar industry collapsed in the middle of the 19th century (Meade
2003). Second, the Northeast has a drastically higher population density than the North,
the other high poverty region, which means there are more poor people in the Northeast
who need help than there are in the North.
Not surprisingly, Northeastern states consistently rank among the worst for
political environment and are the nine lowest ranked states for economic environment
according to the study just mentioned. Nonetheless, microfinance flourishes in the
Northeast. Most of the first MFIs in Brazil, such as CrediAmigo, began in the Northeast
and have survived the economic and political turmoil the country has faced over the
years. Every Northeastern state has more MFI clients per capita than any other state.4 The
state with the highest value in loans per capita is Piauí, which competes with Alagoas for
the title of poorest state in the union. In fact, with one exception, every Northeastern state
has a higher loan value per capita figure than any other state in the union despite the
repressed economy in that region.5 Moreover, the size of the average loan in the
Northeast is comparable to loans in other parts of the country once the cost of living is
accounted for.
To be fair, receipt of loans does not necessarily mean that the loans are being used
productively. There are two obvious ways to figure out if loans are being used

Data on state level microfinance comes from the Brazilian Programa Nacional de
Microcrédito Produtivo Orientado.
5
The exception is Santa Catarina, which is uniquely saturated with microfinance outside
of the Northeast.
4
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productively. The first and most straightforward is to track it directly either by asking
borrowers what they are doing with their loans and how the loans are affecting their
finances or by following their financial transactions in the way Collins et al. (2011) do.
This would, of course, require resources and time and is not a feasible option for this
project. The second method, which is slightly less precise but far more cost effective, is
to infer it from the aggregated data. Assuming that repayment rates are a reasonable
proxy for the borrowers’ finances after taking the loan provides a picture of how
productive the loans are. The logic behind this inference is that a borrower that used the
loan money productively would be able to repay the loan easily since she has more
money coming in than she had before. A borrower that did not use the loan productively,
on the other hand, might find it difficult to repay the loan since she has no more money
coming in than before, but has an additional expense. Not all of these unproductive
borrowers are going to default, but those who do default were almost certainly
unproductive borrowers. So states or regions with higher default rates can be assumed to
have a less productive microfinance sector.
As an example of what a productive borrower might look like, a study of the MFI
CEAPE-PB (Center for Support of Small Enterprises – in Paraíba) found that 88% of its
customers in 2004 operated in the commercial sector, 8% in production and 4% in the
service sector (Pereira 2005). Among those operating in the commercial sector, 70% sold
clothing. Selling clothes is likely an attractive option for many microentrepreneurs
because it requires relatively little capital to get started. At the lowest end of the
spectrum, some microentrepreneurs have carts they park on street corners from which
they might sell shorts, t-shirts and dresses. Several sets of these in three or four sizes
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might be all a microentrepreneur needs to get started. She can buy more stock as need
with the proceeds from previous sales. Alternatively, virtually every Brazilian city has an
open air market. Vendors are generally required to pay a minor fee for the privilege of
setting up shop in the market, but the market is often the primary shopping area for
customers who do not want to pay higher prices for name brand clothes at traditional
retail outlets. The vendor who starts off by selling t-shirts from her cart on the street
corner might take a loan to expand her stock, buying larger quantities for lower average
prices, and thereby capturing more profits. The microentrepreneur might continue to
expand by increasing the types of goods she sells, or by renting a booth in the local
market. She might even eventually open a small shop of her own. With each step up the
commercial ladder the microentrepreneur might need a loan to make the jump. Once she
has made the jump, though, her earning potential increases. On the other hand, if she
takes a loan and makes a bad business choice, she might not have any more profit than
before, or might even reduce her profits, but she has an additional expense in the loan
repayments of capital plus interest.
So the average percentage of the loan portfolio with payment delays of 90 days or
greater and, therefore, by common definition at risk of default, tells an important story.
When the loan portfolio at risk is weighted by the number of borrowers, the region with
the lowest default rate in 2009 was the Southeast at 2.15%.6 Next was the Northeast with
a weighted default rate of 3.41%. Last was the South, which is dominated by Santa

These default figures may seem low considering these loans are generally made without
any collateral, often to the poorest members of society, but they are actually quite normal
for microfinance globally (De Aghion and Morduch 2005).
6
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Catarina, the one state that compares to the Northeast in terms of microfinance saturation,
at 3.67%. The implication is that borrowers in the Northeast are just as good at using
microloans as people in other regions of the country. In fact, accepting the assumption
above there is a broader conclusion from the data. Microfinance borrowers are better than
average borrowers at using loans productively considering the rate of payment delays of
90 days or more for personal credit nationwide is consistently over 5.5%, according to
Brazilian Central Bank press releases (bcb.gov.br).
The fact that microfinance appears to be flourishing in the poorest parts of Brazil
despite the poor political and economic environment suggests that Popkin is right.
Peasants appear to be quite capable of taking risks and making investments. Microfinance
borrowers in the poorest regions are no different in their ability to use loans productively
than borrowers in other regions, but microfinance borrowers as a whole seem to be more
able to use loans productively than average borrowers. Based on the information
presented in the previous section it appears that they often improve their position through
these investments as well since poverty decreased in the parts of Brazil that had higher
levels of microfinance in T1 when the economy was suffering.
Conclusion
This chapter examines the industrial and economic development in Brazil
from1930 to the present, paying particular attention to the role of the state in the
development process. Over the past 80 years Brazil has seen periods of significant growth
and periods of suffocating stagnation, debt and poverty. With that background two
distinct periods in the development of Brazilian microfinance are compared. The first
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period, 1997-2003, was a period of great uncertainty and generally modest economic
performance for the country. Poverty alleviation in the Northeast, where microfinance
was primarily concentrated at the time, declined much more quickly than the rest of the
country. During the second time period, however, 2004-2009, risk was low, the economy
was generally robust and microfinance had spread outside of the Northeast. While
poverty reduction advanced more quickly in the Northeast during the first time period, it
advanced more slowly than the rest of the country during the second time period.
The implication, relative to this study, is that, as in chapter four, the empirical
evidence contradicts the theory from chapter three. Instead, it looks like microfinance
works best, not when conditions are stable and uncertainty is held to a minimum, but
when risk, and therefore uncertainty, is highest. The evidence is convincing, if not
entirely conclusive. The end result is that this examination of how microfinance and
political and economic risk factors affect poverty rates in Brazil stack up in favor of the
same conclusions arrived at in chapter four. Microfinance as a poverty alleviation
mechanism is indeed sensitive to risk of political, economic and financial turmoil, but
rather than being hindered by risk, it is most effective under higher risk conditions.
The final section of this chapter addressed Popkin’s rational peasant hypothesis
(Popkin 1980). Popkin argued that peasants are rational actors whose primary interest is
securing their individual long term economic well-being. As such, they are capable of,
and willing to make investments and take risks in order to improve their position, despite
having very little income. Chapter four and chapter five both suggest that the poor are
indeed capable of making their way out of poverty by taking risks and making
investments through microfinance.
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The theoretical and policy contributions of these conclusions are discussed in the
final chapter of this work. These conclusions were unanticipated at the outset of this
project and may play an important role in the development of microfinance in the future.
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CHAPTER 6
The Future of Microfinance

At the beginning of this project I presented microfinance as a poverty alleviation
mechanism that was qualitatively different from other mechanisms typically discussed by
the development community. Foreign Aid, for example, might function as a poverty
alleviation mechanism when it is used to build infrastructure, fund education or provide
critical resources like food and water. Aid is generally given from one government to
another. Its effectiveness as a poverty alleviation mechanism depends on the recipient’s
ability and desire to use it for productive purposes, but all too often it is used to line the
pockets of the leadership while those who sincerely need help see little or no benefit from
it (Hubbard and Duggan 2009). Aid also comes with strings attached in most cases. For
example, the donor state might require the recipient to spend the money on goods and
services originating from the donor state, which limits the recipient’s ability to use the aid
effectively (Easterly 2006). Moreover, because the donor states usually put a low priority
on aid relative to domestic concerns, aid can be inconsistent during times of economic
stress and this inconsistency can dramatically reduce its effectiveness for poverty
alleviation (Kodama 2012). Finally, there is evidence that political instability reduces the
effectiveness of aid for poverty alleviation (Chauvet and Guillamont 2003).
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This should not be surprising since aid is also often seen by donor states as a
cheap way of influencing the recipient state. If a donor state can buy the recipient state’s
attention for $20 million, the donor’s policy gains might well more than compensate for
the money given in aid. Hans Morgenthau argued that all foreign aid is political, with the
occasional exception of disaster relief aid (Morgenthau 1962). He also explained that
foreign aid should be accepted as part of foreign policy; it fills a gap that military action
and traditional diplomacy cannot. It is an example of coercion via carrots rather than
sticks. Aid that is given for political purposes likely does not have development as the
objective since successful development would weaken the donor state’s influence through
giving aid.
Foreign investment, whether direct or portfolio investment, has been promoted as
a mechanism for poverty alleviation since it can create jobs in factories or mineral
extraction companies while also spurring the economy forward through capital
accumulation and knowledge dispersion in productive sectors of the economy.
Investment is also closely connected to the state. It tends to be carefully regulated by the
state and can be subject to taxes and restrictions. Its effectiveness for poverty alleviation
and durability are sensitive to currency fluctuations, monetary policy, fiscal policy and
political and economic stability (Busse and Hefeker 2007; Daude and Stein 2007).
Portfolio investment tends to be flighty, departing at the first hint of trouble, often at the
moment when the state most needs a stable economy. Because of its flightiness, foreign
investment has been dubbed the “electronic herd” by Thomas Friedman, alluding to its
tendency to stampede without warning, destroying whatever might get in the way of
profits (Friedman 2005). Debt forgiveness programs, structural adjustment loans and joint
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development projects are all subject to the same whims of the donor state as aid and
investment (Balaam and Dillman 2011; Easterly 2006).
Microfinance is different. Governments can regulate microfinance, but they do
not generally disperse it. Governments sometimes fund microfinance, but they do not
usually benefit directly from it. Where aid usually operates at the state level, and
investment operates at the societal level, microfinance operates at the individual or
household level. Once an MFI is properly funded and operated it often does not require
continued support from a donor or investor. Perhaps most importantly, the funds are
given directly to the poor and decisions about how to use the money are made by the
recipients, the poor households who desperately need financial help. If we assume that
the poor are able to make strategic financial decisions as well as anybody else, this means
they may become uniquely suited to addressing their most binding constraints when
financial services are made available.
Since microfinance has a qualitatively different relationship to the state than do
foreign aid and most forms of foreign investment, many scholars who study microfinance
have assumed that the relationship is negligible. This assumption does not seem, at first
glance, to be too unreasonable, and perhaps for some aspects of microfinance it is not.
The puzzle that motivated this research project is the discrepancy between findings of
various microfinance impact analyses. Many studies have found that microfinance is
always, or nearly always positive (Brau, Hiatt, and Woodworth 2004; Brau and Woller
2004; Imai, Arun and Annim 2010; Schicks 2007). Based on conversations with reports
by experts who work with microfinance through international organizations like the
development focused iNGO, ACCION, or the Inter-American Development Bank, most
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practitioners seem to believe that microfinance, at worst, has no effect, and at best can
dramatically change poor people’s lives for the better by providing them with a stepping
stone from which they can eventually make their way out of poverty and onto solid
financial ground.1 On the other hand, a number of other scholars have found evidence
that microfinance is at best ineffective and at worst very damaging (Karlan and Zinman
2009; Roodman 2012).
These opposing results, both from some carefully planned and executed research
designs, suggest a couple of possible conclusions. Some scholars have suggested that
there are cultural factors that have not yet been accounted for (Epestein and Uthas 2010),
that microfinance is not always being properly managed and implemented (Field and
Pande 2007; Hermes and Lensink 2007), or that it has to do with the demographics of the
customers (Remenyi and Quinones 2000), among others. The argument I made at the
beginning of this project is that one of the factors that matters is governance; political
institutions and political and economic stability. The argument is based on the notion that
greater certainty about the future makes investment decisions easier and more efficient,
and that instability will complicate those decisions. It has long been accepted that
uncertainty in the state or the economy makes investment riskier and, therefore, generally
less efficient since investors would be risking too much to safely maximize leverage on
their assets (Pindyck 1993).

Phone conversation with Mark Wenner of the Inter-American Development Bank, May
21, 2012. Phone conversation with Valerie Kindt of ACCION June 20, 2012.
1
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The results of the empirical analyses indicate that stability indeed matters.
However, the evidence did not support the argument that more stable states create an
environment more conducive to the poverty alleviation effects of microfinance than
instable states. Rather, it appears that political stability has little or no effect on whether
microfinance reduces poverty. The risk factors that seem to matter are economic and
financial risk. Although economic, financial and political risk are all correlated, the
evidence is not very convincing that political risk plays much of a role. Also, whereas the
argument made at the beginning predicted that greater risk for instability would make
microfinance less effective at poverty reduction, the evidence supports the opposite
conclusion. That is, greater risk of economic and financial instability seems to make
microfinance more effective at poverty alleviation. The results from both chapter four,
which used regression analysis to study a panel of Latin American states over about 20
years, and chapter five, the case study of Brazilian microfinance, supported the same
conclusions.
In chapter four I used regression analysis to examine the interaction between the
number of microfinance borrowers in a state for a given year, and different measures of
institutional quality and stability to predict infant mortality, the proxy for poverty. None
of the interactions between microfinance and political institutions was significant. Two of
the measures of instability which included political, economic, and financial stability
were though. The interaction with political stability did not meet the 95% confidence
threshold, though the other two did. Since point estimates are not useful for interpreting
interaction terms, I graphed microfinance against infant mortality at four levels of each
type of instability. These visual approximations of the interaction terms showed that more
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unstable conditions tended to have a stronger negative relationship between microfinance
and infant mortality. More stable conditions, on the other hand, tended to have a weaker
or even positive relationship between microfinance and infant mortality. This means that
microfinance is more effective at reducing poverty under greater levels of instability.
Chapter five presented a case study of Brazil. The chapter discussed the political
and economic turmoil that plagued Brazil from the 1930s up through 2012. It then
examined how the microfinance industry developed and evolved in Brazil. Once
microfinance gained a significant presence, around the late 1990s, those states within
Brazil which had more microfinance saw poverty reduction far superior to those in the
rest of the country during about a five year period of relative economic instability. During
a period of greater stability, however, those states which housed most of the microfinance
industry saw poverty reductions very similar to the rest of the country. Again, the
implication is that microfinance seems to work best under conditions of instability.
Theoretical Implications
The results of this study have two major theoretical implications. First, risk and
uncertainty do not appear to be significant hindrances in the microfinance sector the way
they are in other development related sectors. Second, studies like David Roodman’s
(2012) which found that microfinance is not helpful, and studies like Imai, Arun and
Annim’s (2010) which found that microfinance generally reduces poverty at the
household level, are both only partially correct. Third, the conclusions support Popkin’s
rational peasant argument that the poor make investments, even under risk, in order to
improve their economic situation.
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Since Foreign Aid and FDI are both sensitive to risk and instability, it makes
sense that microfinance should be too (Busse and Hefeker 2007; Chauvet and Guillamont
2003; Hubbard and Duggan 2009; Kolstad and Villanger 2008). Risk indeed affects
microfinance, but it has the opposite effect. Three explanations for this divergence were
offered at the end of chapter four. First, it could be that when and where instability is
high, the composition of microfinance customers is different. Perhaps the very poor are
reticent to take loans because they recognize that they are only one financial shock away
from total ruin (Krishna 2010). If the very poor take a loan and the intended productive
use does not pan out, the individual is left with an additional demand on her resources as
she tries to repay the loan, but no additional income with which to do so.
This would be useful information for the continued development of microfinance
because it suggests that a risk hedging approach might be more effective than an asset
accumulation approach to microfinance services (Islam 2009). That is, microfinance
institutions would have a greater effect on poverty by offering insurance services that
would reduce risk for the very poor, so that if an income earner is put out of work or the
economy slows, the household still has the means to meet their basic needs. This does not
directly provide a poor household with assets that can be invested to increase income, but
it might allow the household to reallocate assets away from rainy day savings, which are
often zero interest and held in the home or with a friend or family member, and invest
them in productive capital (Collins et al 2009).
A related and perhaps complimentary explanation is that when risk of instability
is high, an average investor cannot be sufficiently confident of a positive outcome to
make an investment under instability, but the most profitable investments might still
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balance out the risk involved. From the investor's perspective uncertainty effectively
transforms risk in the risk-reward balance from a point to a range. The investor has to
assume that risk – specifically the risk of or the probability of failure – might be
anywhere in that range and will only invest if she thinks the potential payoff is large
enough to balance any probable degree of risk. It is possible that risk has increased along
with political instability and uncertainty although it is not necessarily so. Risk might
remain the same while only uncertainty increases. Uncertainty, then, obscures the true
degree of risk. The investor, by definition, cannot know where in the range of uncertainty
the risk point lies. The result is that microfinance customers in an unstable regime are
actually likely to make more beneficial, although fewer, investments than under a
politically stable regime. The MFI is unable to know the payoff for any given investment,
so it falls to the borrower to determine whether the payoff outweighs the risk and
uncertainty. When it does, she will take the loan. Fewer people, then, should be taking
loans under political instability, but those who do should see just as high a rate of
success, and the success should be greater because this selection mechanism weeds out
the less profitable investments. The effect on poverty is that fewer people will benefit, but
their rewards will be greater. This would show up in the data as a measurable effect on
poverty.
A third possible explanation for the results is that borrowers rely on microfinance
as an informal insurance mechanism. They use loans to fill troughs in their income and
repay loans at peak income levels. Where income is most uncertain, that is, under
conditions of high political or economic risk, households desperately need help
smoothing their income distribution. Microfinance fills that gap, and in so doing
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dramatically improves the quality of life for the savvy MFI customer. The data used in
this project, unfortunately, is not fine grained enough to study whether any of these
posited relationships represents reality, but future research might reveal the nature of
customers’ decision making processes.
The second major theoretical contribution of this work is to present a key
consideration that might modify the results of many past studies. Some scholars have
found evidence that microfinance is useful for poverty alleviation and others have found
that it is not. They might both be partially correct. The research here shows that
microfinance can be both effective and ineffective at poverty alleviation. Variations can
occur from one country to the next and they can occur within the same country at
different points in time depending on whether there are significant changes in risk and
instability. Once again, the data used here is too limited to determine whether the
relationships discovered here resolve the discrepancies between the different findings, but
future research could do so by expanding the current analysis to encompass additional
states. This would be a major step forward for microfinance research. It would help move
the debate from whether microfinance works to how to make it work more effectively.
Finally, Samuel Popkin argued that peasants are rational (1980). More specifically
he showed that peasants do not have romantic perceptions of their positions as laborers,
but rather they are primarily interested in securing their long-term economic well-being.
Peasants, though poor, are often willing to invest what little they might be able to scrape
together if they believe it will improve the future economic position. The results from
chapters three and four support Popkin’s argument. They also show that the poor are able
to effectively invest and take risks, even in uncertain environments, in order to improve
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their economic standing. In fact, based on loan repayment rates, microfinance borrowers,
that is the poor, do this at least as well as, and perhaps better than average debtors.
Implications for Microfinance Practitioners
Microfinance practitioners are aware that microfinance has the ability to improve
the quality of life of their customers. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that peoples’
lives improve when they have access to financial services (Roodman 2012). Simple logic
suggests that this should be the case if one assumes that potential customers are wise
enough to know when they can improve their position through financial services and
when they cannot. If a poor person needs access to financial services and an MFI is
operating in her village, and that MFI offers the type of services the individual needs,
then she can utilize those services to her benefit. If there is an MFI in a person’s village,
but that person cannot improve her quality of life by patronizing its services, then she will
not do so and no harm is done. On the other hand, if there is no MFI, or the MFI does not
offer the types of services the person needs, then an opportunity to improve her quality of
life is missed. Therefore, a good deal of the conversation about microfinance
effectiveness among practitioners revolves around the types of services MFIs offer and
their target audiences. When practitioners acknowledge the role of the state, it is
generally to discuss regulations that affect the MFIs’ ability to innovate and offer the
kinds of services the poor need.
If practitioners become aware of the results of this research, they should realize at
least three things. First, microfinance can be used more efficiently at some times and
places than at others. Second, risk reduction services, like life or health insurance, might
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be needed more than many people have realized. Third, microfinance can only be a part
of the development puzzle.
This research shows that microfinance can range from quite effective as a
mechanism for poverty alleviation, to ineffective and even counter-productive. There are
certainly other factors that influence microfinance effectiveness, but risk is an important
piece of the puzzle. Rather than withdrawing from the market during periods of high
economic and financial risk, MFIs that are motivated by poverty alleviation should
continue operations and allow potential customers to screen themselves. It certainly
would not hurt to offer or even require business management training for loan recipients
during these times, as many MFIs already do, but this research suggests that customers
are already pretty good at determining whether they will be able to repay loans without
suffering under an unprofitable financial burden when it is time to repay the loan. Collins
et al. (2009) show that the poor generally have a good understanding of their finances and
how best to manage them.
Similarly, for those organizations that are interested in poverty reduction at the
global level, microfinance can be used more effectively in some places than in others.
States with higher levels of risk may be more fertile grounds for poverty reduction than
states with less risk. This should be welcome news for microfinance practitioners since
other poverty alleviation mechanisms tend not to be very effective in those states.
Microfinance on the one hand and Aid and FDI on the other might be both be used
effectively, but operating most effectively in polar climates.
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Of course, this also means that microfinance is an important part, but it can only
be one part, of the development puzzle. In a typical developing country with high poverty
and risk, and a struggling economy, microfinance might be very useful for poverty
reduction. When microfinance has done its job, however, there would need to come a
transition point at which risk declines and the economy picks up and stabilizes. At that
point the state is not out of the woods in terms of development, but microfinance would
no longer have the same effect as before. This is not to say that Aid and FDI are
necessarily perfect complements to microfinance, or even that there is a perfect
complement. Only that microfinance can only go so far in promoting development.
Also, risk reduction services might be more needed than many people have
realized. If the very-poor are not taking loans during times of high risk because it puts
them too close to financial ruin, perhaps what they need are not loans but insurance
policies. If this is the case, insurance hedges against the negative effects of risk (Islam
2009). Each time a customer made a claim it would be combatting poverty by preventing
that household from slipping further into poverty (Krishna 2010). Unfortunately, some
states, like Brazil, impose stiff regulations on the microfinance industry. The objective is
generally to protect the poor, but the effect is too often to prevent MFIs from catering to
the needs of potential customers.
All of this should be considered valuable information to individual MFIs, as well
as the sundry international organizations that address poverty and development. The
beginning of this project mentioned the UN’s Millennium Development Goals.
Understanding how poverty alleviation mechanisms work is critical for achieving those
goals. Allowing microfinance to continue on as it has up to this point is not making
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enough progress towards those objectives because although microfinance can reduce
poverty, it might also exacerbate poverty under the wrong conditions. Thus, significant
resources intended to combat poverty are tied up in programs that potentially aggravate it.
We will never approach success without better policies, which requires a better, more
complete understanding of the tools being used.
Future Research
While this research goes a long way in answering some important questions about
microfinance, it is clearly not conclusive. This is only one test of these relationships, and
the findings do not fit with the anticipated results which were discussed at the outset.
Additional research should study these relationships in other states to determine if they
hold outside of Latin America. Future research might also examine these relationships
using different data to verify that the findings are not simply the result of anomalies in the
data used here. The concepts studied in the previous chapters can be operationalized in
many ways and alternative measures might be employed to test the robustness of these
findings. All of this will help clarify our understanding of microfinance and its potential
for poverty alleviation.
As is often the case, in the act of answering one question, this project has raised
several more questions. One important question asks why this relationship is what it is.
This project studied the what, but to fully understand the implications of the
microfinance-risk-poverty relationship it would be beneficial to get some idea of why
microfinance seems to work best under conditions of high risk. Three solutions have been
posited, but without empirical analyses they are only guesses. In order to create good
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policy on microfinance and to advance the theoretical literature it is important to find
some evidence one way or the other. This might be accomplished through surveys or
interviews of microfinance borrowers by asking them about their motivations to pursue
microfinance. It should also ask about perceptions of risk and reward and how those
perceptions might have affected borrowers’ decisions. Additional clarifying questions
might ask about borrowers’ perceptions of the state, and the political, economic and
financial environment and how they might have affected borrowers’ decisions to pursue
microfinance services. The more difficult part of this type of research would be to collect
a rounded sample of people who chose to take loans and people who chose not to.
Finding people who might have considered courting microfinance but decided not to
would be much more difficult than finding people who chose to take loans from an MFI.
All of this will require field work in the countries where microfinance is prominent. Will
require some variation in political conditions as well, in order to see how different
environments might affect people’s choices.
Other questions this project has raised include whether the composition of
microfinance borrowers is different for some reason when risk is higher? If that is the
case, how do they compare to borrowers when risk is low and why do those low-risk
borrowers not see the same changes in poverty reduction as the high-risk borrowers?
Hopefully future research can answer all of these questions and thereby further our
understanding of microfinance and how to approach poverty reduction.
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